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PRECEDENT AS RATIONAL PERSUASION
Brian N. Larson*
Abstract
The ways that judges and lawyers make and justify their
arguments and decisions have profound impacts on our lives.
Understanding those practices in light of theories of
reasoning and argumentation is thus critical for
understanding law and the society it shapes. An inquiry that
explores the very foundations of all legal reasoning leads to
a broad, important question: How do lawyers and judges use
cited cases in their legal arguments? It turns out there is
practically no empirical research to suggest the answer. As
the first step in a comprehensive empirical effort to answer
this question, this article performs a ground-breaking
analysis of a carefully constructed corpus of judicial opinions
and the advocates’ briefs that gave rise to them. It tells us not
just that these textual artifacts cited court opinions, but how
they used the opinions in their reasoning. The article then
reveals whether judges and advocates placed different values
on different ways of using cited cases. These legal authors
used them to make assertions about legal rules in their
arguments about twice as often as they used them as legal
analogies and about four times as often as they used them to
make policy arguments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
practices of judges differed significantly from those of
advocates. But so, too, did those of the prevailing advocates
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and their less fortunate opponents. On functional grounds,
therefore, this article empirically supports the claim that
there is a hierarchy of rational legal argumentative appeals,
and that there is a common look to the ‘losing brief.’ This
special convergence between theory and function can
transform ongoing debates across legal scholarship on the
value of drawing on precedent as a tool for rational
persuasion.
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Introduction
The ways that judges justify their decisions have profound
impacts on our lives. Notionally, at least, the reasoning that judges
use should be rational, if not logical. One role of the attorney in
litigation is to supply the judge an acceptable route to the outcome
that the advocate’s client seeks—signposts in the form of arguments.
These signposts, too, should be rational. An important way that
lawyers and judges make arguments is by using prior court opinions
that they cite in their arguments. This leads to an important question:
How do lawyers and judges use cited cases in their legal arguments?
Legal theorists have spilled a great deal of ink and a great many bytes
of digital text over the question of what counts as a rational argument,
which arguments have “rational force,” whether all legal arguments
should be deductive in form, etc.1 I call these questions
‘metanormative.’2 They are normative questions—explored by legal
philosophers and legal theorists—about what norms legal authors—
judges and advocates—should embrace in their reasoning. Norms
about norms. But empirical evidence about what norms legal authors
do embrace in their reasoning should inform metanormative
thinking.
I do not claim that merely because a certain way of arguing is
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 90 (1990); NEIL
MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 53–54 (2005). See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993); Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 57 (1996); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109
HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF
ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (2d ed. 2016); Brian N. Larson, Law’s
Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes and Legal Analogy, 7 U. CIN. L. REV.
663 (2018).
2 I use this convention: I use double quotation marks only for material I quote
from other authorities. References to the name of a concept or any word or
phrase not quoted from other authorities appear in single quotation marks.
Italics indicate emphasis. Cf. Brewer, supra note 1, at 931 n.14. So I might
write:
1

While Smith called these theories “norms about norms,” I call them
‘metanormative’ and acknowledge that neither usage is widely
accepted.
I also adopt the convention of using third-person plural pronouns (‘they,’
‘them,’ etc.) when referring to individual persons of unknown gender.
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prevalent among lawyers and judges it therefore ought to be. That
argument would lose its head to Hume’s Guillotine.3
But the argument supporting the claim that legal practice should
inform legal theory goes this way: Legal argumentation is practical
argumentation. In that context, if an argument form can be rationally
justified on the metanormative plane and lawyers and judges accept
it in fact on the practical or plain-old normative plane, the argument
form should be metanormatively acceptable.4 If that perspective is
correct, the argumentative practices of judges and lawyers should
inform metanormative legal theory: If lawyers and judges use an
argument form, metanormative theory needs to assess whether it is
rational. If metanormative theory predicts or requires certain
argument forms that lawyers don’t use, then the metanormative
theory must at least account for its inability to model lawyers’
practices. In that case, we should expect the practices of judges and
advocates to represent their normative preferences—and thus the
practical norms of legal reasoning.5 Part I develops this argument
further.
Legal theory offers metanormative claims about how lawyers
should argue by asserting, for example, that certain types of
arguments should be the most rationally persuasive and that certain
principles must guide the use of legal analogies.6 There is practically
very little research, however, about how lawyers do use cases. That
research would take a form I would call ‘empirical legal theory’: the
exploration of questions relating to norms of legal theory, as they are
manifest in practice, using empirical materials and methods.7
‘Hume’s Guillotine’ refers to the mistake of inferring normative principles
solely from empirical observations of what is. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1896) (“[T]he author proceeds for
some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and . . . makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change
is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.”).
4 It can still be a quite-bad argument, especially if its premises are not true
or if it is presented incoherently by its proponent.
5 WEINREB, supra note 1, at 10 (making the same argument by implication);
Larson, supra note 1, at 692–701 (making the argument expressly); Susan E.
Provenzano & Brian N. Larson, Civil Procedure as a Critical Discussion, 20
NEV. L.J. 967, 978–79 (2020) (same).
6 Part I also explores those claims.
7 This is a broader term than “experimental jurisprudence,” which appears
to be the application of experimental empirical methods to legal theory. See,
e.g., Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental
3
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‘How do judges and advocates use cases?’ is a big question.
The problem is that there is no extant study of how lawyers and
judges use cases in their arguments—period.8 Worse, there are no
extant research methods for characterizing case uses in a way that is
useful for answering the questions of empirical legal theory. There is
no method for ‘coding’ them, as a qualitative researcher would say.9
Available research methods are inadequate to the task of answering
these questions because they are either too coarsely or too finely
grained. Typically, the existing methods are coarsely grained and have
involved assessing only whether an argument cites a particular case
anywhere at all, without regard to how many times the argument cites
it or how it uses it.10 These methods are focused on establishing
pecking orders: which opinions, articles, and other authorities courts
cite most often and are therefore most influential. Empirical legal
theory requires a finer grain of analysis than this. In the alternative,
large-scale assessments of legal arguments sometimes approach them
from a rhetorical or stylistic perspective, but these studies often dwell
on minute stylistic details and do not tell us much about the practical
norms of rational persuasion.11 Empirical legal theory requires a
coarser grain of analysis than this.
This study identified five common types of case use in a study of
199 artifacts—the textual documents that were the objects of study
here. A case use consists of all citations to and discussion of a court
opinion in a section of a legal argument to support the assertion of the
author’s claim in that section of argument. The artifacts here were 199
advocates’ briefs and the court opinions they precipitated, which I
hand-coded.12
Assessment of What Dictionary Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell
Legal Interpreters, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020) (examining laypersons’,
lawyers’, and judges’ responses to definitions of terms—“ordinary
meaning”—under experimental conditions).
8 See the review of literature in Part II.B.
9 This ‘coding’ means the assignment of category labels, not authoring
computer code. “A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short
phrase that symbolically assigns a summative . . . attribute for a portion of
language-based . . . data.” JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR
QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS 4 (3d ed. 2016).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 50 through 53.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 66 through 68.
12 Typically, I will use the first-person singular pronoun throughout this
paper when referring to efforts on this study, as I am its sole author. As the
detailed coding guide in the data repository notes, however, most of the text
segmenting and coding tasks undertaken here involved two coders working
together, usually one of my excellent research assistants on the one hand and
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In these artifacts, four types of case use made rational
argumentative appeals: supporting assertion of a rule, supporting a
policy statement, supporting a generalization about prior cases, and
functioning as an example of how to apply a rule, policy, or standard
(what I call a ‘legal analogy’). A fifth type consisted of citing a case
because the author quoted it. And a sixth catch-all type existed for
types of use that did not fall into these categories.13 The list of four
rational appeals proved robust for coding. Of 5638 case uses in the
199 document artifacts here, only 383 (or 6.8%) failed to fall into at
least one of those categories, and more than 1500 fell into two or more
of them.
When it comes to the ways that advocates and judges used these
cases, there was a clear pecking order across all artifacts: Rule-based
case uses were twice as common as legal analogies, which were twice
as common as policy arguments. This article therefore provides
support to one meta-normative theory, the hierarchy of rational
appeals for which Professor Susan Provenzano and I have argued.14 It
may not be surprising that court opinions, which seek to project an
air of authority, used cases significantly more often than advocates’
briefs to support rule statements and significantly less often to
provide examples of the application of rules. This article also shows
how the practices of prevailing advocates differed significantly from
those of the losing attorneys, suggesting that so-called ‘losing briefs’
might have a certain look to them. It also notes that advocates of
parties moving for relief made different uses of cases than those
opposing such motions and that authors in some jurisdictions
employed cases differently than those in others.
These findings should shape scholarship about legal theory,
holding it to account for its (in)consistency with legal practice.
Advocates may be interested to learn how the briefs of prevailing
attorneys varied from those of their opponents. Teachers of legal
theory and practice may wish to guide students toward practices that
are typical of the professionals the students wish to become; on the
other hand, they may wish to oppose the typical performances on
display here and argue that there are better practices. This article
concludes with a call to extend this research, binding legal theory and
me on the other. Brian N. Larson, Coding Guide & Replication Data for
“Precedent as Rational Persuasion,” TEXAS DATA REPOSITORY DATAVERSE
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://doi.org/10.18738/T8/SXNR02. All the data files
used in preparing this article and all the textual artifacts coded in creation of
those data also appear in the data repository. Id.
13 See infra Part II.C.
14 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 978–79.
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practice to each other through empirical research.
In Part II, this article develops a set of methods for studying
empirical legal theory. That part provides a detailed explanation of
methods used here to assist other researchers in reproducing or
criticizing them. I ground these methods in contemporary
argumentation theory and adapt them from methods in applied
linguistics and writing studies. Part III then reports the principal
findings. It answers two research questions, the first—using a pilot
study to identify categories of case use—as a preliminary exploration
of the second, a presentation of the relative frequency with which
judges and advocates made these types of use of cases.15 Part III also
revisits the question of what kinds of use authors put cases to,
considering whether case uses that did not fall into one of the four
rational appeals identified here might exhibit some other pattern.
Part IV then discusses the findings.
I. Theoretical & Empirical Contexts
This article provides partial answers to the very broad question:
How do judges and advocates use cases in their arguments? No
single study will answer that question completely. The question is
what Professor Merton called an “originating question,” or what the
researcher “wants to know.”16 Fact-focused studies are necessary to
lay a foundation for explanations, because law scholars are too ready
“to assume that they know the facts about the workings of [law]
without special investigation, because [law] is, after all, their native
habitat.”17 This part briefly explains one particular theory about how
judges and advocates argue and identifies two resulting research
questions that this study took on. Here “[t]he originating question
must . . . be recast to indicate the observations that will provide a
provisional answer to it,” which usually “requires a search for
empirical materials through which the problem can be investigated to
good advantage.”18 We must explore the general problem in some
particular instance(s).
The theory at issue here is the theory of legal topoi, which
identifies three broad categories into which rational legal arguments
must fall—empirical, conventional, and values-based—and places
them in a hierarchy, with the first of them more rationally persuasive
See infra Part I.A.
Robert K. Merton, Introduction: Notes on Problem-Finding in Sociology,
in SOCIOLOGY TODAY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS ix, xiii (Robert K. Merton et
al., eds., 1959).
17 Id. at xv (describing fact-focused studies in the context of sociology).
18 Id. at xxvi.
15

16
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than the second, and the second more than the third.19 Part I.A.
describes that theory in more detail and grounds the research
questions for this study in it. Part I.B. considers previous studies of
legal argumentation and what they can tell us about these questions.
Before proceeding to those discussions, though, it is important to
identify a basic framework for discussing legal argumentation and for
motivating empirical study of argumentation within that framework.
Argumentation is “a series of propositional sentences—called
‘premises’—arranged in a form that supports the truth or acceptability
of another propositional sentence, called a ‘conclusion.’”20 As a
consequence of this definition, “any written or spoken legal analysis—
whether it appears in a memorandum analyzing some aspect of the
law, a lawyer’s brief written to persuade to a court, or a court’s opinion
written to justify or explain a decision—contains argumentation.”21
Metanormatively, legal argumentation should be rational or
“cogent”; that is, it should consist of “premises . . . acceptable to the
audience to whom it is addressed, relevant to its conclusion, and
sufficient to warrant belief in its conclusion.”22 Legal argumentation
is thus dialectical, in that it anticipates a verbal exchange where the
parties subject their claims to critical assessment to “move from
conjecture and opinion to more secure belief.”23 In this article, I refer
to a ‘rational appeal’ as a dialectical argumentative move that
contributes to the cogency of the argument of which it is a part.
Lawyers, however, strive to win, so they are interested in
constructing arguments that are persuasive. Legal argumentation is
Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1025. As used here, ‘topoi’ are
merely categories of arguments appropriate in certain circumstances, a term
that derives from classical rhetoric. Id. at 1005–06.
20 Larson, supra note 1, at 668 (citations omitted). I consider the
argumentation to include both the premises and the conclusion.
21 Id. Some scholars distinguish the arguments of lawyers from the
“justification” of judges. Id. n.21 (citing Schauer, supra note 1, at 571 n.2). As
both satisfy my definition of “argumentation,” I cannot support the
distinction.
22 TRUDY GOVIER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT 119 (1999).
23 Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, Strategic Maneuvering: A
Synthetic Recapitulation, 20 ARGUMENTATION 381, 382–83 (2006)
(“[D]ialectic is defined pragmatically as a method for dealing systematically
with critical exchanges in verbal communication and interaction ‘that
amounts to the pragmatic application of logic, a collaborative method of
putting logic into use so as to move from conjecture and opinion to more
secure belief.’”) I avoid the term ‘logical’ in terms of describing legal
arguments and argumentative moves because of various senses in which that
term is used. Larson, supra note 1, at 674–75.
19
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in this sense rhetorical, in that advocates and judges seek
argumentation with an eye toward its “potential effectiveness . . . in
convincing or persuading an audience in actual argumentative
practice.”24 Consequently, proponents of legal arguments often
supplement rational appeals with what I will call ‘tactical appeals,’
argumentative moves that the proponent uses to make the argument
more persuasive.25 This could include an argumentative move that
might be termed ‘purely rhetorical,’ in that it does nothing to increase
the cogency of the argument, but rational and tactical appeals are not
mutually exclusive. Only when a tactical appeal leads the audience
away from a cogent argument is it deceptive or fallacious.26
This article is concerned principally with rational appeals but
without derogation of tactical appeals, including applied legal
storytelling and legal stylistics.27
van Eeemeren & Houtlosser, supra note 23, at 383.
This concept is adapted loosely from the argumentation-theoretic concept
of strategic maneuvering. Id. (“Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts
arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for rhetorical
effectiveness with maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness.”).
“Strategic maneuvering manifests itself in argumentative discourse in the
choices that are made from the ‘topical potential’ available at a certain stage
in the discourse, in ‘audience-directed framing’ of the argumentative moves,
and in the purposive use of ‘presentational devices.’” Id. The presentational
devices of their definition come closest to my notion of the tactical appeal.
See also VAN EEMEREN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY 552–
55 (2014).
26 van Eeemeren & Houtlosser, supra note 23, at 387 (“[F]allacies are
violations of [rational] critical discussion rules that come about as
derailments of strategic maneuvering.”).
27 See Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and to
This Symposium, 14 LEGAL WRITING 3, 3 (2008) (describing storytelling as
“the backbone of the all-important theory of the case, which is the essence of
all client-centered lawyering”); Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a
Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J.
ALWD 63, 64 (exploring the “concern that [legal storytelling] may be too
powerful or, perhaps, inappropriately powerful”); Shaun B. Spencer &
Adam Feldman, Words Count: The Empirical Relationship Between Brief
Writing and Summary Judgment Success, 22 LEGAL WRITING 61, 61–62
(2018) (“measur[ing] the statistical relationship between brief readability
and case outcomes”); Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, Clearly,
Using Intensifiers is Very Bad—Or Is It?, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 171, 173, 181
(2008) (exploring use of intensifiers “very,” “obviously,” “clearly,”
“patently,” “absolutely,” “really,” “plainly,” “undoubtedly,” “certainly,”
“totally,” “simply,” and “wholly” and showing “excessive intensifier use in
appellate briefs is associated with a statistically significant increase in
24
25
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A rational appeal on any legal issue follows the generalization for
practical argumentation that philosopher Stephen Toulmin
identified: Practical rational arguments consist of data or facts and a
“warrant” that justifies a move from those facts to some conclusion.28
Reframed in terms of the law, a rational legal appeal requires a set of
operative facts and a legal standard—a rule, principle, policy or the
like—that calls for a certain outcome in the presence of those facts.29
In principle, we could see this pattern as a deduction:
Major premise:
Minor premise:
Conclusion:

If operative facts, then normative consequence.
Operative facts.
Normative consequence.30

Of course, requiring a deductive rule here oversimplifies legal
reasoning in important ways, because an argument may not articulate
a major premise in terms of a clear deductive rule; the warrant may
be a policy such as the best interest of a child or a principle such as
judicial efficiency; and the argument may articulate the major
premise only in the outcomes of precedent cases where no clear rule
emerges from them.31
Toulmin’s insight was that practical argumentation is “field
dependent”—that is, argumentation in different fields may have
conclusions of different logical types, and “there are common
standards applicable in [their] criticism . . . .”32 So an argument from
any field, for example, that would support an assertion about who
should “be a member of the U.S. Davis Cup team . . . or for adopting
Fröhlich’s theory of super-conductivity . . . is . . . tested against its own
appropriate standard.”33
Deductive arguments, when they are available, are “fieldinvariant”—they work in any field—because they are “analytical,” that
is, the conclusion of the argument does not convey any new
information.34 Consider this well-worn example:
adverse outcomes for the ‘offending’ party, but in other situations . . .
excessive intensifier use was associated with a significant increase in
favorable appellate outcomes”).
28 STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 90–91 (updated ed. 2003).
29 See MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 24.
30 Id.
31 See generally Larson, supra note 1 (proposing defeasible argumentation
schemes as a model for non-deductive argumentation in law).
32 TOULMIN, supra note 28, at 15.
33 Id. at 35.
34 Id. at 116.
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All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.

It is hardly necessary to utter the conclusion that Socrates is a mortal,
because it provides no new information. The two premises necessitate
that conclusion.
There is no question that deductive reasoning is welcome among
law judges and advocates. A legal rule is a premise in a deductive
argument, like the major premise in a syllogism.35 For example:
‘Under municipal ordinance, anyone who operates a vehicle in a
municipal park is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ This states a rule in the
form “[a]ccording to legal authority J, in every instance with features
f1 . . . fn, legal category A applies,”36 or just “‘[w]henever OF [operative
fact(s)] then NC [normative consequence],’”37 or ‘OFàNC.’ If the
prosecutor combines this with the syllogism’s minor premise, the
operative facts that the defendant did indeed operate a vehicle in a
municipal park, then they may seem to compel the normative
consequence that the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor.
But law, like most human endeavors, permits non-deductive
arguments. Consider this example:
In a previous case before the highest court in this jurisdiction,
the defendant was found liable under circumstances similar to
this case; consequently, the defendant in this case will likely
be liable.
This seems like an entirely commonplace and acceptable argument in
the law, though it is by no means deductively valid or sound. Would
such an argument work in the science of epidemiology? How about
this:
Recently in this community, an eight-year-old child
contracted the COVID-19 virus but did not develop significant
symptoms; the child before me is eight years old and has
contracted COVID-19 and consequently will likely not develop
significant symptoms.
Note that I only reluctantly refer to legal reasoning by deduction as a
‘syllogism,’ for reasons I have explained elsewhere. Larson, supra note 1, at
676 n.64.
36 Id. at 698.
37 Id. at 676 (quoting MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 24).
35
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Even one not trained in science can recognize this is not an acceptable
scientific argument. Two reasons present themselves for the differing
acceptability for these arguments. On the practical-normative level,
lawyers are likely to find the first example acceptable and scientists
are not likely to accept the second; in short, field-dependent norms
dictate whether the form of the argument is acceptable. On the
metanormative level, the reason that the argument form is reasonable
in law and not in science may be that law and science reach
conclusions of different logical forms. In law, the conclusions are
about what legal consequences will flow from operative facts; the
court’s judgment on an issue is a declaration that brings that very
state of affairs into being. When scientists offer an observation about
a scientific fact, they are making an assertion about how the world is.
A judge or lawyer’s argumentation about a legal issue generally
consists in their assertions about what the law is, what the facts of the
instant case are, and how the former apply to the latter.
Conventionally, no U.S. judge should write an opinion to justify a
decision, and no lawyer should write a brief to urge a particular
outcome, without using previous court opinions, often just called
‘cases,’ to support the argumentation in them. Of course, other
authorities affect the arguments: Statutes and regulations may supply
some or all the legal rules, and secondary sources may supply
interpretive frameworks or arguments that lawyers and judges find
compelling, or at least moderately persuasive. This particular study
focuses only on the use of cases as authorities, however.
This study gathers empirical evidence for one theory about how
judges and advocates use cases—the legal topoi.
A. Theory & Questions About Legal Topoi
Professor Hanns Hohmann, an argumentation theorist and
scholar of communication and the law, considered how to adapt the
classical stases of Greek and Roman rhetoric to contemporary legal
argument.38 Hohmann argued that the rational arguments lawyers
make in civil litigation fall into one or more of three “general
dimensions of argument”—“operative, regulative, and optative.”
Professor Susan Provenzano and I have argued that these dimensions
are related to the classical stases in a slightly different way and that
Hanns Hohmann, The Dynamics of Stasis: Classical Rhetorical Theory
and Modern Legal Argumentation, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 171 (1989); see also
Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 988–1001 (providing a treatment of
classical stasis theory, applicable definitions and conventions, etc.).

38
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Hohmann’s dimensions are akin to the classical topoi, categories of
arguments applicable in certain circumstances.39
Summarizing our perspective: A legal rule, standard, or
principle—Toulmin’s warrant and similar to the major premise of the
deduction—applied to legally relevant facts—Toulmin’s data and
similar to the minor premise—resolves every legal issue. The topoi
categorize the warrants and data that the law uses to resolve issues.
We renamed them “empirical,” “conventional,” and “values-based”
and defined them as follows:
[The] empirical topos refers to arguments grounded in
observations about the world, including observations about
factual events and legal texts, and rational inferences about
them. The conventional topos refers to arguments that
employ legal standards to categorize or interpret facts or law
in a certain manner. The values-based topos covers
arguments that appeal to underlying legal norms or real-world
consequences, but within the constraints that our legal system
imposes on such policy-oriented and emotionally appealing
arguments.40
We proposed—“provisionally”—that normative appeals are more
rationally compelling than conventional ones, and conventional more
than values based.41 We did not provide a metanormative justification
for this hierarchy, and our empirical evidence for it consisted of
references to selected cases, not a systematic study.
This study extends that work. Before the present study, I had
intuitions about how lawyers and judges used cited cases in their
Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1005–06.
Id. at 1025. This hierarchy is similar to the hierarchy that Professors
MacCormick and Summers proposed for statutory interpretation in their
collection of essays taking a comparative approach to that question. See D.
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 511, 512–14 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). In decreasing order of
preference, “[l]inguistic arguments” are those based on the meanings of the
actual words used in a statute; “systemic arguments” include arguments
based on “contextual harmonization,” precedent, and analogy; and
“teleological/evaluative arguments” include arguments about legislative
purpose. Id. at 512–14; see also Eveline Feteris, Prototypical Argumentative
Patterns in a Legal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the
Justification of Judicial Decisions, 30 ARGUMENTATION 61, 63 (2016).
41 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1025.
39
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arguments, and I could point to artifacts where argument proponents
did as I expected. Those intuitions are grounded in the cases that I
have happened to read over the years and my felt sense of what is
typical in them, not in a systematic collection and analysis of
arguments. Based on this theory, if lawyers and judges share this
metanorm as a practical norm, we would expect them to prefer to
make more arguments using rules, fewer using case examples or legal
analogies, and even fewer asserting policies. Before the present study,
however, there were no data that showed the presence or magnitude
of these differences or how those types of arguments work together.
In fact, there were no data to support the claim that those are
generally the only types of rational uses to which advocates and judges
put case precedents. We also did not know the extent to which they
cited cases for tactical appeals.
Thus, at the root of the present study is the question, ‘How do
lawyers and judges make use of cited cases to support their
arguments?’ It’s also a really big question. Even narrowing it to
explore this one theoretical problem leaves a pretty broad range of
options for exploration. Consequently, I developed these research
questions:
Research Questions
RQ1. To what uses did the judges and attorneys put
citations to previous cases in their opinions and
briefs in the artifacts selected for study here?
RQ2. With what relative frequency did they use cases in
these ways?
That the answers to these questions matter is on some level
obvious: The ways that judges and lawyers make and justify their
arguments and decisions have profound impacts on all our lives.
Understanding those practices in light of theories of reasoning and
argumentation is thus critical for understanding this country’s laws
and its society.
There are practical and pedagogical implications as well.
Understanding what counts as typical for legal arguments is
practically important for lawyers making those arguments. If lawyers
present their arguments in unexpected ways, they may be harder for
the reader to comprehend, resulting in a failure of the communication
and its argument.42 Understanding what counts as typical for legal
See Brian N. Larson, Gender/Genre: The Lack of Gendered Register in
Texts Requiring Genre Knowledge, 33 WRITTEN COMMUNICATION 360, 364

42
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arguments is practically important for legal pedagogy as well. Legal
textbooks and books on legal theory targeted at law students make
assertions about how legal arguments do or should work, and those
assertions should be consistent with what lawyers typically do, or they
risk disadvantaging the students who believe in them. For example,
Professor Fredrick Schauer’s Thinking Like a Lawyer purports
“mostly . . . to introduce beginning and prospective law students to
the nature of legal thinking.”43 Regarding the use of cited cases,
however, he asserts that one either must use an explicitly stated rule
from the case or infer from the case what that rule would be before
applying it to the current legal problem.44 Some textbooks on legal
analysis make similar claims.45 If these views are not consistent with
an empirical assessment, we should not teach them to law students; if
empirical data support them, so much the better.
As Part I.B. shows, there have been no answers to these research
questions from an empirical perspective. They remain unknown.
B. Relevant Literature
My review of bibliometric, legal, and argumentation scholarship
did not reveal satisfactory answers to the research questions. The
scholarship in applied linguistics and writing studies suggested some
(2016). “Genre knowledge comprises components of the communicator’s
cognitive environment: her assumptions about communicative behaviors
she expects to have a particular effect or effects on a reader based on
knowledge about a typified situation in the writer’s cognitive environment.”
Id. at 364. If the author of a legal brief, for example, varies from genre
conventions, she imposes higher cognitive effort on her reader; the
unexpected performance of the author is harder for the reader to
comprehend. See id. at 362–65.
43 FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING xi (2009).
44 See generally id. ch. 3.
45 See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK,
A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 116 (3d ed. 2018)
(counseling argument proponents to precede each use of a case as an
example with a “hook” a statement “of the legal principle that the case
illustration will clarify and prove to be true”); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. &
SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 53 (2008) (framing case analogies with the
description of “determinative facts” that unite the cited and instant cases).
But see MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND
ANALYSIS 145 (2d ed. 2015) (counseling argument proponents to use
“explanatory synthesis”—statement of a principle synthesized from the
example case(s) but allowing for merely case-by-case comparison of
examples).
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methodological perspectives but did not address legal argumentation.
None of the existing research methods was adequate for answering
these research questions
Numerous theories in bibliometrics exist for why scholars cite
other works.46 Studies exist, too, to explore how students cite works
in school writing to introduce topics, support claims, and compare
and contrast findings of cited works with each other and with
students’ own projects, among other purposes.47 There are nods, too,
to a rhetorical motivation in each kind of writing.48 Sociological and
bibliometric theories of reference and citation explain them in
functional, normative, and phenomenological terms.49 These
perspectives do not provide insights to the questions in this study
because they do not address the litigation context—where the
arguments function for different purposes than those in academic
papers.
Within the legal scholarship, there is a rich theoretical discussion
about legal analogy and legal deduction.50 Law scholars have written
a great deal about legal reasoning, precedents, etc.51 But there is very
Emanuela Riviera, Scientific Communities as Autopoietic Systems: The
Reproductive Function of Citations, 64 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH.
1442, 1450 (2013) (Citations “pay intellectual debts; . . . are considered as
reward devices; they work as concept symbols, standing for shared
knowledge; they work as codes and medium of communication.” (citations
omitted))
47 See generally Lee-Ann Kastman Breuch & Brian N. Larson, Research and
Rhetorical Purpose: Using Genre Analysis to Understand Source Use in
Technical and Professional Writing, in POINTS OF DEPARTURE: RETHINKING
STUDENT SOURCE USE AND WRITING STUDIES RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE
STUDY OF STUDENT WRITING (Tricia Serviss & Sandra Jamieson eds., 2017).
48 See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION 30–44 (1987) (describing the
rhetorical functions of citations in the scientific article).
49 Blaise Cronin, Metatheorizing Citation, 43 SCIENTOMETRICS 45, 46–48
(1998). Functionalists explain citations as the citing author’s effort to
“provide supplementary evidence, to support or refute an hypothesis, to
furnish historical context.” Id. at 46. Normative theorists describe the social
norms, including “dispensing of [rewards to cited authors] within the
scholarly communication system . . . . [and] providing . . . socially
appropriate cues and reinforcers.” Id. at 47. Phenomenologists explore how
“social-psychological variables [shape] an author’s referencing behavior.” Id.
The perspectives are not mutually exclusive.
50 See generally Larson, supra note 1, and sources cited therein.
51 See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1949); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS (3d ed. 1997); LARRY
ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING (2008).
46
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little empirical work examining how lawyers and judges actually use
cases in their arguments. The legal literature is replete, though, with
citation-focused studies.52 Nearly all of it relies entirely on noting
whether an opinion has cited an authority anywhere at all, or not—a
scale that I will explain below is inadequate for this project. Like many
efforts in the legal academy, such studies focus on pecking orders: the
“most influential” law reviews, law-review articles, judges, courts,
opinions, etc.53
Some studies purport to focus more on how or why judges make
choices about the authorities they cite. Professor John Merryman’s
study was an early one, later updated.54 Merryman offered numerous
For lengthy, though by no means exhaustive, summaries, see Dietrich
Fausten, Ingrid Nielsen & Russell Smyth, A Century of Citation Practice on
the Supreme Court of Victoria, 31 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 733, 734–36
(2007); Kevin Bennardo & Alexa Z. Chew, Citation Stickiness, 20 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 67–75 (2019). Note that in many ways, the study of
citational bibliometrics in law much pre-dates that in the broader academy.
Fred R. Shapiro, Origins of Bibliometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation
Analysis: The Neglected Legal Literature, 43 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. 337,
337 (1992).
53 For example, Sirico and Margulies assessed the frequency with which the
U.S. Supreme Court cited legal periodicals. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., & Jeffrey B.
Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical
Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 131–32 (1986). Sirico followed up on this study
later. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court:
1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009 (2000). It is unclear whether the researchers
there counted a one-to-one relationship between opinion and cited journal,
where a journal article would count as one if it was cited anywhere in the
opinion, one time or many; or a many-to-one relationship, where a journal
article was counted as one each time an opinion cited it. The first study is
silent on this question, Sirico & Margulies, supra at 132 n.3, while the latter
seems to suggest the many-to-one approach, Sirico supra at 1010 n.9 (“For
purposes of consistency, we counted a citation only when the citation
included the name of the law journal. For example, we would not count an
‘id.’”). For other pecking-order studies, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449 (1991) (identifying
the most-cited articles from the first 100 years of the Yale Law Journal);
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial
Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998) (using “the number of citations to the published
opinions of judges on the federal courts of appeals to measure the influence
of individual judges”).
54 John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California
Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954) [hereinafter
Merryman, Authority]; John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of
52
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proposals for why judges cite authorities: shoring up the institutional
legitimacy of the court by providing certainty or predictability; to
recognize the parties’ reliance on precedent; supporting the veil of
impartiality over the law or the judge that precedent provides;55
maintaining “the fiction of an abstract law which is mechanically
applied by its instrument, the judge”; satisfying society’s expectations
or demands “that the judge decide cases in the traditional judicial
manner”;56 and satisfying natural drives “toward certainty and
simplicity” with “law [that] appears to be stable, certain and
ascertainable through consultation of the appropriate writings
(authority).”57 He claimed that citations to authorities advanced
efficiency objectives.58 Finally, he argued that judges have a habit or
natural propensity to cite.59 His evidence for this, however, was only
the frequency with which the California Supreme Court and
individual judges on it cited various authorities.60 It is difficult to see
how he could draw these conclusions from those data.
Other studies are interesting because they have used citation
counts to argue about (a) whether courts use cited cases to decide the
law rationally or as window-dressing to legitimize their decisions,61
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1978)
[hereinafter Merryman, Theory].
55 Merryman, Authority, supra note 54, at 613–22.
56 Id. at 625.
57 Id. at 626.
58 Id. at 622 (satisfying the parties’ reliance on precedent); id. at 624
(reviewing prior decisions for possible solutions to the instant case rather
than reinventing the wheel); id. (valuing the “accumulated wisdom and
experience” of the previous judges); id. (“disposing of legal problems with
relative finality, rather than allowing them to be relitigated to no purpose”);
id. (simplifying the judge’s argument, “letting [the judge] dispose of the
problem on the basis of conclusions reached in earlier decisions”).
59 Id. at 625 (transferring “some of the responsibility for [the judge’s]
decision to other shoulders than [the judge’s] own”); id. (recognizing the
“inertia” of the judicial process); id. (the influence of habit and training on
lawyers and judges); id. (satisfaction of the urge “toward symmetry, toward
system-building”); id. at 626 (a natural tendency to “[r]espect . . . the
opinions of those who have gone before, especially the dead ones”); id.
(satisfying natural drives “toward certainty and simplicity” with “law [that]
appears to be stable, certain and ascertainable through consultation of the
appropriate writings (authority)”).
60 Id. at 650–72; see also Merryman, Theory, supra note 54 (replete with
tables of tallies throughout).
61 Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul J.
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(b) how judges use scientific and social scientific research in
opinions,62 and (c) whether judges cite the same cases that parties’
briefs do.63
All these studies attempted to answer their research questions by
counting associations between cited authorities and citing artifacts—
court opinions or advocates’ briefs.64 In other words, if an artifact cites
an authority anywhere, one time or a dozen, to support one point or a
dozen, it still just counts as one citation. Some of the scholars noted
the limitations of this approach, acknowledging that actually
examining the content of the opinions could answer more of their
questions.65
Some studies of legal argumentation in the law do look at more
granular data. For example, Professor Nina Varsava has explored the
stylistic practices of Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch in opinions
before their appointments to the Supreme Court.66 Professors Lance
Long and William Christensen explored whether the use of
intensifiers, such as “clearly” and “obviously,” correlated with the
Wahlbeck, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their
Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489. They concluded that the
answer is not black and white. Id. at 573.
62 In 1990, Acker considered the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court used
“social science research evidence” in its opinions, and the extent to which the
Court found those citations in briefs of the parties or amici or on the Court’s
own initiative. James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal
Cases and Briefs: The Actual and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists
as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 28 (1990).
63 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 52.
64 Cross et al., supra note 61, at 522–25, is interesting in that it also used
network analysis, a means of identifying cases that are more “central” in their
tendency to be cited, but still based on citation counting. Citation studies in
the law also include those where the researcher assesses the impact of a
patent by the frequency with which it is cited in later patents. See generally
Jonathan H. Ashtor, Does Patented Information Promote the Progress of
Technology?, 113 NW. U. L. REV 943 (2019).
65 E.g., Merryman, Theory, supra note 54, at 384; Bennardo & Chew, supra
note 52, at 107 n.133.
66 See generally Nina Varsava, Elements of Judicial Style: A Quantitative
Guide to Neil Gorsuch’s Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ONLINE FEATURE
75
(2018),
https://www.nyulawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/NYU-Law-Review-Volume-93-Varsava.pdf;
Nina Varsava, Computational Legal Studies, Digital Humanities, and
Textual Analysis, in COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE PROMISE AND
CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN LEGAL RESEARCH ___ (Ryan Whalen ed., 2020),
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307084.
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success of appellate briefs67 and whether an author “faced with an
argument that a legal writer believes—or knows—she is likely to lose,
the writer will tend to write in a style that uses more intensifiers.”68
This focus on stylistic matters, however, addresses the tactical appeals
that I described above and does not address the rational appeals in
legal arguments.
Argumentation theory similarly has a rich tradition theoretically
addressing the use of cited cases or precedents in legal
argumentation.69 The studies of actual court opinions there, however,
tend to involve close reading of a very small number of opinions.70 I
hope, however, to answer the descriptive question—How do authors
use cited cases in their arguments?—generally at some scale.
Outside the law and argumentation theory, there is work in the
field of writing studies and applied linguistics, particularly in the area
of genre theory, that accounts for the use of cited authorities. For
example, applied linguist John Swales analyzed scholarly research
articles to identify their genre characteristics.71 He segmented the
Long & Christensen, supra note 27, at 181.
Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously)
Attack: The Theory of Argumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR.
L. REV. 933, 938 (2013).
69 E.g., ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 274–79 (Ruth
Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 1989); MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 143–
61; C.H. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE
ON ARGUMENTATION 351–57 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969)
(treating argument from precedent as argument by example). See generally
Kevin D. Ashley, Precedent and Legal Analogy, in HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION (Giorgio Bongiovanni et al. eds., 2018).
70 For example, Feteris analyzed a single U.S. Supreme Court case. Feteris,
supra note 40, at 70–77. Plug looked for linguistic cues in a small number of
court opinions to characterize their role in marking text as dictum. José Plug,
Indicators of Obiter Dicta: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of Textual Clues
for the Reconstruction of Legal Argumentation, 8 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
& L. 189, 192–202 (2000). And Kloosterhuis looked at three court opinions
for evidence of certain argumentation schemes. Harm Kloosterhuis,
Reconstructing Complex Analogy Argumentation in Judicial Decisions: A
Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, 19 ARGUMENTATION 471, 475–82 (2005).
71 A genre is “a class of communicative events, the members of which share
some set of communicative purposes.” JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS:
ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS 58 (1990); see also Larson,
supra note 42. In the law, there are numerous genres, such as the demand
letter, complaint, trial motion and brief, appellate brief, etc. See generally
ALEXA Z. CHEW & KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, THE COMPLETE LEGAL WRITER
(2016). These are textual artifacts that have common forms because they
address common purposes. See id. at 4 (defining “genre” as “a recurring
67
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articles into typical sections, like introduction, methods, results, and
discussion.72 Within the sections, he analyzed certain rhetorical
“moves.” A move “in genre analysis is a discoursal or rhetorical unit
that performs a coherent communicative function in . . . discourse.”73
This might be a group of sentences, a sentence, or even a clause.74
Swales considered the structure of discussion sections in research
articles and the moves there, including background information,
statement of results, and references to previous research.75 The last of
these, reference to previous research, is most like citing cases in a legal
text, and Swales asserted that authors use them “for purposes of
comparison with present research and . . . for purposes of providing
support for present research.”76 Others have extended this work in the
field of technical communication, studying the ways that students
made use of cited sources to situate their own work in technical-report
writing.77 Neither of these genre-theoretic approaches subjected legal
communication to analysis.78
Counting citations does not supply an adequate method for
document type that has certain predictable conventions” and “conventions”
as “parts of a genre and the ways that audiences expect a genre to be
written”).
72 SWALES, supra note 71, at 137–76.
73 JOHN M. SWALES, RESEARCH GENRES: EXPLORATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 228
(2004).
74 SWALES, supra note 73, at 229. For example, in the introduction to a
research article, an author typically establishes the territory of the article
(Move 1), establishes its niche (Move 2), and then occupies the niche (Move
3). SWALES, supra note 71, at 140–43. Moves are then further subdivided into
steps. See, e.g., id. at 142–47. This is a functionalist approach akin to that
described for citations above. See supra note 49. The approach from this
study will be functionalist in similar ways.
75 SWALES, supra note 71, at 172–73.
76 SWALES, supra note 71, at 173.
77 See generally Breuch & Larson, supra note 47. They analyzed artifacts at
the atomistic or sentence level, eschewing the more flexible move, which
could be longer or shorter than a sentence. Id. at 186. They found that
students used references to previous research much as Swales had suggested,
but that a common purpose for that move was also to introduce a new topic
or new material, something Swales had not identified. Id. at 193.
78 Bhatia did so in a book chapter in which he analyzed the common-law
“legal case” of Roles v. Nathan [1963] 2 All ER 908. VIJAY K. BHATIA,
ANALYSING GENRE: LANGUAGE USE IN PROFESSIONAL SETTINGS 129–35 (1993).
Though he examined the text carefully, it was still only one court case, not
enough to generalize even about opinions by the same author, let alone legal
arguments generally.
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assessing how, functionally, authors use citations to previous
opinions in their legal argumentation. Thus, answering the research
questions identified above will not benefit from merely identifying
those court opinions that a legal argument cites. Cases may also be
used in diverse ways in distinct parts of an artifact. An extended
example may help bring the categories alive and show concretely how
they can overlap. Consider, Hosseinzadeh v. Klein,79 artifact 17.03.00
in this study, where the court analyzed fair use. While discussing the
first fair-use factor, the court cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc.80
“The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether
the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579,
114 S.Ct. 1164.81
Here, we can read the use of Campbell as an effort to offer authority
for the rule or policy statement contained in the quoted passage. The
citation is, of course, also necessary to explain the use of the quotation
marks. But the same opinion cites Campbell again, in the section
discussing the fourth fair-use factor:
The question is whether the allegedly infringing work serves
as a “market substitute” for the allegedly infringed work, not
merely whether the market for the allegedly infringed work
was harmed. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (noting
that critical parodies may legitimately aim at harming the
market for a copyrighted work, and that “a lethal parody, like
a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original [but]
does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright
Act.”).82
Here, it seems that the Hosseinzadeh court cites Campbell in support
of its assertion of two other rules: One regarding the extent to which
the court must consider market harm, and the other (in the
explanatory parenthetical) the rule that the harm a parody does to the
276 F. Supp. 3d 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
81 276 F. Supp. 3d at 41–42 (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 43.
79

80

158

The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute

Vol. 25

market of its original is not cognizable under the Copyright Act. A few
lines later, the court continues: “Accordingly, ‘the role of the courts is
to distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses
demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it.’ Campbell, 510
U.S. at 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164.” This seems to support the previous rule
about parodies and market effects.
But how should we characterize the function(s) of Campbell in
this opinion? Hosseinzadeh cites one case; it uses that case to prove
three legal rules and to support three quotations from the cited case;
the rule and quotation functions co-occur, with two citations together
supporting one rule and two supporting one rule each.
For the present study, therefore, I concluded that I would need to
segment textual artifacts in some fashion to determine how the cited
cases function in different parts of the instant argument, and I would
need to determine some means for counting what phenomena are
present. Analysis on the sentence-by-sentence level—or word-byword, as some of the stylistic studies have done—was likely to produce
too many units of analysis, particularly because many sentences in an
artifact—opinion or brief—do not refer to cases at all.83 Looking for
Swalesian moves or steps would have been problematic in part
because it is difficult to define move or step boundaries.84 I describe
the solution to that problem and the methods I used for coding the
resulting argument segments in Part II.
II. Materials & Methods
It would be impossible to examine how all judges and advocates
have used cases in all situations. Consequently, I selected a narrower
set of materials. Part II.A. explains which artifacts I chose to study
and why. I had to develop new methods to analyze these artifacts,
because as Part I.B. showed, the methods of previous studies were not
sufficient to answer my research questions. The methods I employed
were first to segment the arguments to analyze, a process described in
Part II.B., and then to assign coding categories to the case uses, a
process described in Part II.C. Readers not interested in
methodological details about this study may wish to jump to Part III
for the findings of the study and proceed to Part IV for interpretations
of them.

83 See supra note 77 (discussing a study using sentence-by-sentence or
atomistic coding).
84 Breuch and Larson noted the challenges for reliability of defining text
segments for analysis. Breuch & Larson, supra note 47, at 188.
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A. Data Selection & Collection
This section describes the strategy for selecting and method for
collecting data for this study and the resulting corpus. I chose just one
area of law because I suspect there are genre-theoretic85 concerns
about mixing case types. Each body of law may represent its own
genre(s) in legal briefs and opinions. Consequently, lawyers arguing
about family, criminal, contract, and other bodies of law may employ
different practices to make their points. Variations across such genres
might function as noise in analyzing any particular practice across
them. Better would be to study one subject-matter area and then
sample across other types of case to see whether patterns observed
here are present there. I chose copyright fair use, mostly because it is
interesting to me.
Fair use is a doctrine under copyright law that permits a
secondary user of a copyright-protected work to make use of it in a
way that would otherwise be copyright infringement.86 It is an
affirmative defense that defeats the rights holder’s infringement
claim.87 It requires a balancing of four factors on a case-by-case basis:
(1) the purpose and character of the [secondary] use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 88
Fair use, and copyright generally, is also exclusively subject to the
jurisdiction of federal courts.89 The choice of fair use raises some
See supra notes 42, 71 and accompanying text.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
87 Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (“This
affirmative defense presumes that unauthorized copying has occurred, and
is instead aimed at whether the defendant’s use was fair.”).
88 17 U.S.C. § 107. Courts balance the factors on a case-by-case basis.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is
not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”).
89 28 U.S.C. § 1338. But see T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 824 (2d
Cir. 1964) (noting that an action where “the purported sole owner of a
copyright alleged that persons claiming partial ownership had recorded their
claim in the Copyright Office and had warned his licensees against
disregarding their interests was not one ‘arising under any Act of Congress
85
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questions or limitations relating to this study.90 Though I address
some of them in the findings and discussion below, only further
research will resolve the others. I chose district courts as the source
for these artifacts because in the federal hierarchy, trial courts provide
more access to the day-to-day work of lawyers and judges.91 In
practice, what this means is that there is far more legal reasoning and
argumentation at the trial-court level simply because there are more
cases adjudicated there, and each case may require many stopping
points or stases where the parties and the judges consider legal
arguments.92 Appellate courts, on the other hand, hear fewer cases,
and it is possible that the kinds of arguments there will be different
because of the different role of these courts in our system.93 If we are
exploring practical norms relating to the use of cases in arguments,
we should consider those places where most of the arguments are
happening.
relating to . . . copyrights’”).
90 One concern with copyright opinions is that they are not proportionally
distributed across all trial courts at the federal level. In this sample, 137 of
the artifacts, or 68.8%, were from district courts in the Second and Ninth
Circuits, which tend to have fuller copyright dockets because of the
concentration of entertainment and publishing businesses in New York and
California. The best I can do with this concern is to note it and suggest that
future studies should look at different slices of lawyers’ practices, or at
different communities or sub-communities in the genre-theoretic senses. See
supra notes 42, 71. See the findings in Part III comparing artifacts from cases
in the Southern District of New York and other courts. Part III.A.5. Second,
given fair use’s factor-based nature, the relative frequency of the category
called EXAMPLE below might be expected to be higher here than in artifacts
relating to other bodies of law. The remedy is to conduct further studies in
other areas of the law.
91 See U.S. Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2018,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2018 (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (noting that in 2018, civil filings
in regional courts of appeal totaled 49,363; in the Federal Circuit, 1617; in
district courts, 358,563); Supreme Court of the United States, Granted &
Noted
List:
October
Term
2018
Cases
for
Argument,,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/grantednotedlist/18grantednotedlist
(identifying fewer than eighty cases that received grants of certiorari in that
term).
92 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1019. While each appellate filing
usually results in one round of lawyers’ briefs and a single opinion, a filing in
district court may result in many rounds of briefs and opinions from the
court.
93 Nevertheless, I do recommend in the conclusion to this article that
researchers should apply these methods to appellate legal arguments.
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The data for this study were 199 artifacts, consisting of portions of
fifty-five court opinions and 144 of the parties’ briefs that led to them.
The opinions in question are reported opinions of federal district
courts resolving dispositive motions relating to copyright fair use.94 I
selected reported opinions randomly from the period January 1, 2012,
through December 31, 2018, from those coded in Westlaw’s key
numbering system with key 99, section 53.2, “Fair use and other
permitted uses in general.”95 For each opinion, I checked the docket
and the opinion itself to identify which motion papers were related to
it. Many opinions resolved more than one motion implicating fair use,
as, for example, when the parties cross-moved for summary judgment
on that question.96 In each instance, I pulled the non-moving party’s
opposition memo but did not pull further reply briefs.97 I believed it
was important to have a round (or two turns) of argument where
possible on the fair-use issues. If a moving party used a court’s
opinion in its brief in support of a motion (or in support of its fair-use
defense), it might be important to see whether and how the nonmoving party used the same opinion in its argument. For purposes of
coding here, the artifacts consisted only of the portions of the briefs
that addressed fair use.98 I downloaded the opinions from Westlaw
For my purposes, ‘dispositive motion’ here includes post-trial briefs.
I intentionally designed this study to avoid the need for human
participants: The research materials and data are all available publicly online
and thus require no intervention or interaction with the authors or litigants
and no access to private information. I therefore did not need to seek review
of this project by my institution’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
96 For example, in Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Center for BioEthical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. SACV 11–
731 JVS) (artifact 12.03.00 in this study), the parties raised fair use in their
cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points
& Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 10 (Apr. 16,
2012), ECF No. 40 (artifact 12.03.40 in this study) (raising fair-use defense);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 9 (Apr. 16, 2013), ECF No. 45 (artifact
12.03.45 in this study) (arguing that defendant could not succeed on fair use)
97 There is a narrow band of exceptions to this statement: Where the
copyright owner brought a claim for infringement and then moved for
summary judgment, it occasionally omitted any reference to fair use,
probably because it is an affirmative defense. If the copyright-claim
defendant then raised fair use in its opposition memorandum, the claim
plaintiff would address fair use in a reply brief. In this study, we would code
the first brief raising fair use and the first brief from the other side
responding to it.
98 My RAs and I read the entire briefs. See Larson, supra note 12 (describing
94
95
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and the applicable briefs from Bloomberg Law. I followed the
procedures in the coding guide.99
For each artifact, I recorded the forum court; the procedural
posture of the case; the identity of the brief’s author and, in the case
of a law-firm author, the approximate size of the firm;100 whether the
artifact was a judge’s opinion, a rights holder’s brief, or a secondary
user’s brief;101 whether the rights holder or secondary user prevailed
the process for selecting the coding span).
99 See Larson, supra note 12. Some of the artifacts in the data repository are
subject to U.S. Copyright law, which vests in authors of texts like the briefs
here the exclusive right to make copies of them. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). The
opinions of the federal judges in this study are not, however, subject to
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 105. Providing copies of working documents
relating to opinions in the data repository thus creates no copyright liability.
As for the lawyers’ briefs, even wholesale copying and distribution of lawyers’
briefs by commercial services Westlaw and Lexis has been held to be fair use
under the Copyright Act. White v. West Pub. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). I contend that providing these copies in association with
this study is a fair use.
100 One to ten lawyers, eleven to fifty lawyers, fifty-one to 200 lawyers, and
more than 200 lawyers. I considered the possibility that some readers might
assume that practices they consider sub-optimal might be coming from suboptimal practitioners. I gathered firm-size information to be able to assess
whether large firms (with firm size being in some people’s minds directly
related to quality of lawyers) engaged in different practices than smaller
ones.
101 Regarding copyright fair use, I use the terms ‘secondary user’ and ‘rights
holder’ in this way: A rights holder is a party in copyright litigation that owns
a copyright that another party to the litigation may have infringed. A rights
holder is often the plaintiff in a copyright action, though that is not
necessary, as for example when the rights holder is the defendant in a
declaratory judgment action. See, e.g., Richards v. Merriam-Webster, Inc.,
55 F. Supp. 3d 205, 210 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding there was no fair use where
the plaintiff was a pro se secondary user seeking a declaration that his
proposed use of portions of defendant/rights holder’s dictionary would be
fair use). I used this term instead of ‘plaintiff,’ ‘defendant,’ ‘moving party,’ or
‘non-moving party’ when describing a case for coding. A secondary user
copies (or is alleged to have copied) at least a portion of the work of the rights
holder and asserts that any such copying is protected under the fair-use
doctrine. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir.
1994) (“The traditional fair use analysis . . . [adjusts] the competing interests
of authors—the author of the original copyrighted work and the author of the
secondary work that ‘copies’ a portion of the original work . . . .”) (emphasis
mine). See also id. at 920 (referring to “secondary user”). The secondary user
is often the defendant in a copyright case, but it may be the plaintiff if it has
brought a declaratory judgment action against the rights holder.
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in the opinion;102 whether each brief was in support of a motion
(usually for summary judgment or to dismiss for failure to state a
claim), in opposition to it, both, or neither;103 and whether the client
of the brief’s author was the prevailing or non-prevailing party on the
fair-use issues discussed in it. The Appendix describes the resulting
corpus and data.
B. Segmenting Legal Arguments
As I noted in Part I.B., I needed to segment the argument texts
analyzed here to determine how judges and advocates cited cases in
different parts of an artifact. To address this issue, I used an idealized
hierarchical text-segmentation strategy suggested by rhetorical
structure theory (RST), with each proposition that constitutes a
claim, called a “nucleus,” supported by other propositions, called
“satellites.”104 RST idealizes the textual argument as having a main
claim (sometimes also called a conclusion or standpoint) and sees all
the parts of the text as falling into collectively exhaustive and mutually
exclusive subsidiary arguments. A statement that receives support is
a nucleus, in RST-theoretic terms, and each statement that supports
it is a satellite. One can think of it as a form of outline or tree view of
an argument, with each level consisting of discrete sub-arguments
supporting the conclusion immediately above it.105 Legal opinions and
briefs are well suited to hierarchical textual analysis because
canonical perspectives in law-school teaching recommend

102

It was possible that each had a partial victory.

103 Practically speaking, judges’ opinions were the only artifacts in the neither

category. Briefs could obviously be in support or opposition to a motion, but
sometimes a brief functioned in both ways.
104 See generally William C. Mann & Sandra A. Thompson, Rhetorical
Structure Theory: Toward a Functional Theory of Text Organization, 8
TEXT–INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE 243 (1988);
Maite Taboada & William C. Mann, Applications of Rhetorical Structure
Theory, 8 DISCOURSE STUDIES 567 (2006); Maite Taboada & William C.
Mann, Rhetorical Structure Theory: Looking Back and Moving Ahead, 8
DISCOURSE STUDIES 423 (2006); Marie-Francine Moens & Rik De Busser,
First Steps in Building a Model for the Retrieval of Court Decisions, 57
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 429 (2002); C. Reed
& A. Daskalopolu, Modelling Contractual Arguments, 4TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION, pp. 686–92, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
(1998).
105 I have not adopted the full RST framework, as I am interested only in the
uses of cases as support. RST is much more thorough and operates a much
smaller scale than I need to (or want to, given the effort involved).
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hierarchical structure in legal writing.106
I identified coding spans, the sections of each argument we would
analyze closely.107 Second, we recorded the number of words and the
raw number of citations to court opinions in the coding span.108 I refer
to these as ‘raw citations’ in the findings below.109 Third, we broke the
text below each nucleus or claim down into satellites or subpoints in
support of that nucleus. We continued by treating each satellite or
supporting claim as a nucleus or principal claim that was in turn
supported by other satellites.110 The lowest level of satellite (that is,
the satellite that is not also the nucleus for segments of arguments
below it) is the point at which the text identifies some legal rule,
principle, policy, or label and then shows how the facts in the instant
case relate to it, without recourse to analysis of some subpoint within
it. This might be the lowest application of what legal-writing teachers
call “CREAC,” “IRAC,” or some other acronym that indicates the
structure of giving a legal rule, principle, or standard, explaining it,
sometimes with case examples, and applying it to facts in the instant

See, e.g., RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 125–
30 (2008); DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS:
LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 106–08 (3d ed. 2007); LAUREL
CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 134–37 (4th
ed. 2006); see generally RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., Combining Proofs of
Separate Conclusions of Law, in LEGAL REASONING & LEGAL WRITING 131
(6th ed. 2009).
107 See Larson, supra note 12 (more completely describing the process for
text segmentation). This was the text segment that contained the top-level
nucleus or claim—usually that a party’s motion for dismissal, summary
judgment, new trial, etc.—on the issue of whether there was fair use. In short,
they identified the segment(s) of the brief or court opinion that addressed
fair use.
108 Every citation to any court case in the coding span counted, including
short forms and “id.”
109 Note that raw citations did not include what I call “secondary citations”;
these are citations within another citation that explain that the cited source
was citing or quoting another source or that provide subsequent or prior
history for the cited source. See Larson, supra note 12. This choice does not
reflect any particular theoretical stance. Rather, for the sake of reliability in
coding, it is a choice that must be made, and having been made, it should be
expressed.
110 At each level, coders highlighted the statement of the nucleus/claim, and
in those cases where the nucleus was not clearly stated, the coders inserted
bracketed language that did that work and highlighted the bracketed
language.
106
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case to reach a conclusion.111 That might involve application of a legal
label, such as ‘the secondary user’s use is a parody’; or assessment of
a legal factor or subfactor, such as ‘the secondary works are not
transformative’ or ‘the secondary user’s commercial use does not
support a finding of fair use.’ As a consequence of these efforts, it was
possible in each case to extract a tree or outline of statements that the
brief supports with arguments.112
These efforts resulted in a division of the 199 artifacts in the study
into 1810 distinct argument segments, 459 of them in the opinion
artifacts and 1351 of them in the brief artifacts.
After segmenting the arguments in the coding spans, we identified
the first citation to each case in each argument segment. The result
was a coding unit that I call a ‘case use.’ A case use is a correspondence
between one segment of an artifact’s argument and a single cited case
and encodes the argumentative purpose(s) of citing that case in
support of the argument in that section. An argument segment may
cite the case more than once, but there is only one case use per
segment per case cited.113
C. Coding Categories
Given that I divided the artifacts in this study’s corpus into
argument segments and that each case cited in an argument segment
represents a case use, I needed to decide what categories to assign to
these case uses. During a pilot study described in subpart 1, it became
evident that judges and advocates were using cases for a relatively
small number of purposes, and that they could use each case for more
than one purpose in a single argument segment. The pilot study
provided a tentative answer to Research Question 1, which asked to
what purposes the judges and attorneys put citations to previous cases
in their arguments.114 I concluded that judges and advocates use cases
to support assertions about legal rules, provide examples of
application of legal rules, assert policy justifications for outcomes,
generalize about prior cases, and support quotations from cited cases;
I observed few other common uses. I formalized the results of the pilot
study in the coding categories described in subsection 2, which I used
for the broader study.
See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK,
A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 93–95 (3d ed.
2018).
112 Consider the reconstruction of the argument in the text in Part III of the
Coding Guide. Larson, supra note 12.
113 For an extended example, refer to Part III of Larson, supra note 12.
114 See supra Part I.A.
111
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1.
Pilot
Study
(answering
Research
Question 1)
I worked to develop a typology for the uses that authors of court
opinions and legal briefs made of the opinions that they cited. I
worked with a research assistant, and we began simply by reading
dozens of opinions and briefs and asking ourselves, ‘What’s going on
here?’ ‘What is this author trying to achieve by citing this opinion?’
We started with detailed descriptions of what we saw, we discussed
them with each other, and gradually, we settled on categories into
which these uses normally fell.
We immediately saw that an argument section within an artifact
might use a single cited opinion in multiple ways. This is consistent
with previous studies.115 But we could have called most of the uses we
saw rational appeals.116 The authors might make them in the following
ways: First, the author might assert the existence of a legal rule before
applying that rule to the instant case. Citation to a prior opinion would
support the claim that the rule exists in the form the author asserted.
Second, the author might assert that courts in previous cases have
generally taken a particular approach. This is akin to asserting a rule,
but somewhat less of a commitment to its universal nature; it suggests
a rule of probability or rule of thumb without asserting it universally.
Third, the author might describe a previous case, including facts
about it and its outcome, to permit the author then to argue that the
instant case should come out the same (opposite) way because the
cases were (dis)similar. Fourth, the author might cite a prior opinion
to assert that a policy goal or consideration supports a particular
outcome.
The four rational uses of cases that the pilot study identified
correspond to the topoi described above. First, authors who cite a case
for a legal rule are using an empirical topos, often quoting an opinion
when asserting what a rule of law is. Citation to a prior opinion
supports the claim that the rule exists in the form the authors assert.
Second, the use of a case example, where the author describes a
previous case, including facts about it and its outcome, then argues
that the instant case should come out the same (opposite) way
because the cases were (dis)similar, is a conventional topos.117 Though
that approach is common in legal reasoning, it does not compel a
See, e.g., Breuch & Larson, supra note 47, at 191.
See text accompanying note 23, supra.
117 Reasoning by legal analogy is a key component of legal reasoning
generally. For a fuller discussion, see generally Larson, supra note 1, and
sources cited there, including particularly those at 664–65 nn.2–3.
115

116
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conclusion to the same extent that the first does. Third, the author
uses a values-based topos when citing a prior opinion to assert that a
policy goal or consideration supports a particular outcome. Though
this is still a rational appeal, courts are reluctant to apply policies
directly to facts, as that places them in the role of legislatures; the
possible exception is policies arising in and from the rules of court
themselves, where judges have broader discretion. A fourth category
of case use, asserting that courts in previous cases have generally
taken a particular approach, did not fit easily into the three legal topoi,
but it was common enough to warrant its own category here. Such a
rule of probability or rule of thumb requires an inferential step from
‘several have been decided in a certain way’ to ‘this case should be
decided the same way.’ It is thus something like an empirical
argument, but the number of cases cited to make a generalization was
sometimes as small as one, and that does not satisfy any commonly
accepted form of inductive reasoning; consequently, such
generalizations seem to be conventional (or field-dependent) in the
law.
This exhausts the list of commonly observed rational appeals.
Conventionally, an author should support any quotation from a
case with a citation to that case. The status of a case quotation under
the legal-topoi model is complex. These case uses often had rational
functions, as every quotation qualifies as a de facto empirical
argument about what some legal text says. It may nevertheless
require conventional or values-based arguments to determine what
the legal text means. Supporting rational arguments, however, was
apparently not the only purpose for which authors quoted opinions.
Authors often used quotations in ways that seemed less designed to
appeal to the reader’s reason and more to the reader’s emotion or
sense that the writer was speaking authoritatively—in short, tactical
appeals.118 We also identified some case uses that either did not fit into
the categories above or that appeared to be doing something specific
in addition to those typical uses. Consider the parting quote/cite and
stitched application/quote, fairly common practices discussed
below.119
2.
Coding Categories & Process Used in
this Study
Based on the pilot study, I developed the following approach to
coding the case uses. Again, recall that ‘coding’ here refers to the
118
119

See text accompanying note 25, supra.
See infra Part III.B.
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process of assigning category codes as described here, not to writing
computer code. Note that references in this section to artifacts in this
study transition to being references to documents and coding units
according to the numbering scheme in the coding guide rather than
to typical case and case-document citations. Thus ‘14.01.00’ is the
court’s opinion in case 14.01, and ‘14.01.10’ refers to a brief in the case
14.01 with the PACER/ECF identification number 10. References to
case uses within an artifact use the ‘CU’ abbreviation—for ‘case use’
(or ‘coding unit’). So ‘14.01.00 CU01’ refers to the first case use in the
opinion 14.01.00.120 The coding guide further describes and illustrates
the coding categories themselves.121
Two coders coded each artifact.122 Coders reviewed an entire
argument section in which a coding unit appeared because the case
cited in the coding unit may have been cited elsewhere in the same
argument section. Coders coded the case use for all the uses made
within the same argument section. They indicated which, if any, of
five identified uses the author was making of a case in each portion of
All the data are available in the data repository, an online supplement.
Larson, supra note 12.
121 Larson, supra note 12.
122 I was one of the two coders on each of 169 (84.9%) of the artifacts. Because
I recognize that different readers can perceive a case use as functioning in
different ways, we took a greedy approach to codes: If one coder saw
something the other did not, they resolved the difference in a conference,
accepting the code if both coders thought it was at least plausible. A stingy
approach, where a unit receives a code only if both coders saw it
independently, is also justifiable but represents a conceptually different
emphasis. We might interpret greedy coding as identifying plausible uses of
opinions and stingy coding as identifying predominant uses of opinions.
Because of this strategy, I was not particularly concerned about assessing
inter-rater reliability. Nevertheless, I summarize IRR checks here: Mean
pairwise, per-case-file observed agreement among coders was 86.9%. The
Cohen’s Kappa statistic measures the amount of non-chance agreement two
coders achieve. Jean Carletta, Assessing Agreement on Classification Tasks:
The Kappa Statistic, 22 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 249, 252 (1996). In this
study, mean pair-wise, per-case-file Cohen’s Kappa was 0.52.
Interpretations of the Kappa statistic are “clearly arbitrary” but provide
“benchmarks.” J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of
Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977).
Landis and Koch provide the following interpretations: 0.21–0.40 “fair,”
0.41–0.60 “moderate,” 0.61–0.80 “substantial,” and 0.81–1.00 “almost
perfect.” Id. The calculation of agreement did not include thirty-eight
artifacts that we coded using an approach that did not preserve individual
coders’ codes (case files 12.01, 12.02, 13.01, 13.02, 15.01, 16.01, 17.01 and
17.03).
120
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the argument and marked all that applied. For example, if the author
cited the case to support a quotation at one point in an argument
section but as an example at another point in the same argument
section, I instructed the coder to count both use types. There were five
defined uses to which arguments put cases and a catch-all category
for uses that did not fit in the five. Each case use thus received at least
one code.
We coded a case use as RULE if the author cited the case to support
a legal rule that the author asserted in the text. A rule is a statement
that could be applied to facts to derive a legal outcome. It usually
comes in the form of operative facts lead to/compel/suggest
normative consequence or normative consequence results from
operative facts. For example, ‘If a secondary use is a fair use, there is
no liability for infringement.’123 The assertion of a rule did not need to
be entirely clear about the direction a normative consequence will go
based on operative facts.124
We coded author citations to a case to support an assertion about
what courts often, usually, or generally do as GENERALIZATION.
Generalizations thus commonly began with certain phrases, such as
‘Courts have traditionally . . .’ or ‘Courts have routinely . . . .’ Such cue
phrases were not necessary, though. It was common for a string cite
to follow a generalization, and in that event, each of the cases in the
string cite was usually supporting the generalization.
Where the author cited a case to support a claim that some policy
underlies the law in this area, we coded it as POLICY. A policy
statement tells us the why of a rule or legal principle. It might
generally be understood to be the complex assertion that some
consequence is good and that some rule or practice is justified because
it brings about that consequence.125
Where the author cited a case to support a quotation from the case
in a section of the argument, we coded it as QUOTATION. Coders
marked this option even if the quotation appeared only in a
parenthetical after the case citation.
Where the author cited a case as an example of a court deciding a
case in this body of law and for which the author provided some facts
See the examples for this and other codes in Part III of Larson, supra note
12.
124 Consider 13.01.00 CU09, where the author implied but did not directly
state that the secondary user’s use of more of the original work would make
the use less likely transformative.
125 See DOUGLAS WALTON, CHRIS REED & FABRIZIO MACAGNO, ARGUMENTATION
SCHEMES 332 (2008) (describing the “Argument from Positive
Consequences”).
123
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from the cited case, the cited case’s outcome, or both, or for which the
author at least impliedly compared or contrasted facts of the case with
the instant case, we coded it as EXAMPLE. Sentences referring to cases
that begin with ‘In Case Name . . .’ often offered examples. The ‘In
Case Name . . .’ heuristic did not always work, though.
If we believed the argument segment cited the case for some other
purpose (whether or not we marked it for any of the five previous
purposes), we marked the case use as OTHER USE and added a
comment in the note field in the database indicating what purpose we
thought it was. Sometimes it was unclear what use the author was
making of a case. Many times, the addition of a parenthetical
explanation to a citation could have helped a great deal. Other times,
the use was clear, but it was not among those in the coding scheme.126
Part II has described the selection and collection of data for this
study and described the text segmentation and coding strategies
developed for it. Part III offers the findings.
III. Findings
In this study, I identified 1810 argument segments in the
arguments relating to copyright fair use127 in a total of 199 artifacts,
trial-court opinions and lawyers’ briefs that gave rise to them. I then
coded each case use in each section to categorize it according to
whether it proved a rule, supported a generalization, provided an
example of a previously decided case, asserted a policy justification
for a rule, supported a quotation, or served some other purpose, with
many case uses serving more than one of these purposes.
I have assessed the findings along several dimensions to answer
two research questions:
RQ1.

To what uses did the judges and attorneys put citations to
previous cases in their opinions and briefs in the artifacts
selected for study here?
RQ2. With what relative frequency did they use cases in these
ways?
The research questions responded to theoretical questions raised
in Part I, and particularly whether the legal-topoi theory Professor
Provenzano and I put forward finds evidence in these data. Section
II.C. provided a preliminary answer to RQ1 and the coding categories
used to answer RQ2.
126
127

Part III.B. provides further elaboration of what I found.
See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
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Part III.A first looks at the artifacts and the frequency of case uses
within them to answer RQ2. There I note that all legal authors use
cases to support rule assertions relatively frequently. They use them
as examples of how the law is applied less frequently, and they use
them to support policy statements less frequently still. This fits with
the theoretical perspective of the legal topoi.128 But practices vary
significantly between advocates and judges, between advocates on the
winning and losing side, and between advocates supporting and
opposing motions.
Finally, Part III.B tracks back to the first research question. In
Part I.C, I developed a list of coding categories based on the pilot
study. But after coding more than 5600 case uses, it is possible to
review those coded OTHER to see if there are any common (or even
uncommon but interesting) types of case use not in the original
taxonomy. The uses that I found made rational and tactical appeals.129
Part IV interprets these findings.
A. Coded Case Uses in These Legal Arguments
This section reports the findings of this study regarding the
practices of judges and advocates using cases in artifacts—opinions
and briefs. It first provides an overview taking into account all the
artifacts in the study. From a genre-theoretic perspective, it is also
useful to consider whether different authors, responding to different
social situations, may have made different choices about how to use
cases.130
I categorized artifacts and report findings here based on several of
these potential community divisions. For example, judges’ opinions
(n = 55) have different audiences—the parties and courts of appeals—
and different purposes—making new law, justifying a decision,
discouraging appeals, withstanding appellate review—than do the
briefs of the parties’ attorneys (n = 144). Attorneys writing briefs may
face different challenges depending on whether their cases were
strong (measured here by whether they prevailed on fair use (n = 62)
or not (n = 54)).131 It is also possible that authors writing briefs
seeking summary disposition of fair-use issues through motions
(n = 68) write with a different focus than those opposing such
See supra Part I.A.
See infra Part III.B. For definitions of ‘rational’ and ‘tactical’ appeals, see
text accompanying notes 23 and 25, supra.
130 See supra notes 42, 71 and accompanying text.
131 A small proportion of the opinions (9 or 16% of the total) provided
outcomes that were mixed on fair use, so I did not categorize the associated
briefs based on prevailing party.
128
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motions (n = 62).132 And finally, the practices of attorneys and district
court judges in a jurisdiction where copyright cases are more
common—the Southern District of New York (n = 96)—might differ
from those in other regions (n = 103).
I gathered the applicable data and examined these subgroups of
artifacts to ascertain if there were statistically and practically
significant differences among them along those dimensions.133 The
Appendix describes the statistical tests in some detail, but in simple
terms, statistical significance measures whether the differences
between subgroups are real, and practical significance measures
whether they are large enough to be interesting.
1. Characteristics Across All Artifacts
There were a great many differences among the case files and
artifacts in terms of their lengths and the number of raw citations in
them.134 Between 62% and 84% of raw citations were typically case
uses. This means that most authors in these artifacts did not cite an
opinion more than once in a single argument segment. To be able to
compare the artifacts, I normalized most of the variables that I
assessed by calculating their relative frequency, measured as
frequency per thousand words. So, for example, if an artifact was
5,834 words long and had 33 case uses, it had 5.66 case uses per
A small proportion of the briefs (10 or 7% of the total) qualified as both
supporting and opposing motions, as in the Plaintiff's Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Nov. 5. 2012), ECF. No. 41 (artifact 12.02.41 in this
study), in National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985
(W.D. Wash. 2012), where the party opposing a motion also makes a motion
in its memo of opposition. There was also a small proportion of briefs (4 or
3% of the total) where neither party was moving party, as in BWP Media
USA, Inc. v. Gossip Cop Media, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(artifact 16.02.00 in this study), and Barcroft Media, Ltd. v. Coed Media
Group, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 339, (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (artifact 17.04 in this
study), where the artifacts were the parties’ post-trial briefs or letters to the
judge.
133 The Appendix addresses some technical issues regarding statistical and
practical significance. For a further discussion of practical significance, see
text accompanying infra, notes 192 and 194.
134 As Table 2 shows, there was great variation in the length of artifacts and
in the numbers of citations and case uses in each case file. Table 3 shows the
same statistical characteristics (except for number of artifacts) across the
artifacts themselves. It also provides a ratio of case uses to total raw citations
in the artifact, where the denominator is the total number of times the case
was cited (including ‘id.’ used to cite a case fully cited earlier).
132

2021

Precedent as Rational Persuasion

173

thousand words.135 The mean number of case uses per thousand
words of argument was 7.99 and the median was 7.88.136
The central objective of this study has been to characterize the
uses lawyers and judges make of cases. Using the coding scheme
developed above, we can see the relative frequency with which the
writers of these artifacts made the use of opinions to support rules,
make generalizations, provide examples, support policy statements,
and support quotations.
Figure 1. Frequency of Case-Use Types per Artifact (N =
199)137

This was the case with artifact 13.02.00.
See Table 4 in the Appendix.
137 See Table 4 in the Appendix for underlying data.
135

136
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Figure 1 depicts the findings in a box plot.138 It shows the
significant difference in relative frequencies between RULE and
QUOTATION case uses and the others. Indeed, if we compare the interquartile range (IQR) or typical range of RULE case uses (3.26 – 6.90)
and QUOTATION case uses (3.82 – 6.99) per 1000 words, we can see
that they overlap very substantially, occurring with similar frequency
across the sample. Typical ranges of case uses coded as POLICY (0.31
– 1.85 / 1000 words) and GENERALIZATION (0.00 – 1.36) were the least
common, again overlapping very substantially with each other.
Occupying the gap between the most and least common case uses is
the typical range of case uses coded as EXAMPLE (1.45 – 3.73 words). I
interpret these findings in Part IV.
2. Opinion Artifacts vs. Brief Artifacts
Because judges’ opinions have different audiences and purposes
This is a form of data display that may require some explanation. In a box
plot, the box represents the interquartile range of the values, with the vertical
line across it indicating the median value. The horizontal lines extending
from the boxes—sometimes called ‘whiskers’— represent 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR). If there are any outlier values beyond the whiskers,
they are represented with small circles. The box-and-whiskers plots have the
virtue of representing both the dispersion and skewness of the data. So in
Figure 1, for example, we can see that the values for RULE case uses are
clustered in the IQR between 3.36 and 6.90 uses per 1000 words and those
for EXAMPLE case uses between 1.45 and 3.73, while the outliers span a larger
range, up to 15.33 for RULE and 8.92 for EXAMPLE. The values for these two
statistics are thus fairly tightly dispersed around the medians, but notice that
both values exhibits some skewness: the RULE values are slightly left-skewed,
because the portion of the box to the left of the median is slightly larger than
that to the right. The EXAMPLE values are slightly right-skewed.
The box-and-whiskers plot exhibits one characteristic that may seem
counterintuitive to readers familiar with bar charts and histograms. In bar
charts and histograms, the size of a bar indicates how many observations fall
within the category indicated by the bar: the more observations, the bigger
the bar. With the box plot, the size of the box indicates the dispersion of the
values. So in Figure 1, if we look at example case uses, we can see that the
part of the box to the right of the median is larger than the part of the box to
the left. This does not mean that there are fewer observations in the area
represented by the left part. In fact, there are exactly as many observations
represented by the right part of the box as represented by the left—one
quarter of the observations in the sample. The comparative thinness of the
left portion of the box represents a concentration of one quarter of the overall
values in a smaller range; the comparative thickness of the right part of the
box represents a lower concentration, one quarter of the overall values in a
larger range.
138
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than parties’ briefs, it was likely that they might exhibit different caseuse characteristics. As it happens, lawyers and judges made use of
cases as RULE and EXAMPLE with significantly different frequencies.
The frequency of case uses to support a RULE is greater in opinions
than in briefs; the opposite is true for EXAMPLE case uses, where
opinions use them less frequently. Figure 2 presents the data.
Figure 2. Case Uses in Briefs (n = 144) & Opinions (n =
55)139

Consequently, there are practically significant differences in the
frequency of use between briefs and opinions in two of the case-use
139

See Table 5 in the Appendix for underlying data.
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categories: RULE and EXAMPLE. The apparent difference between
briefs and opinions on the other three categories is more modest and
not, in my view, practically significant.140 Taking the RULE category
first, the medians were noticeably different between briefs and
opinions. There is also a difference in dispersion of the values in that
the relative frequency of RULE units was typically in the range of 2.99
– 6.37 / 1000 words, while in an opinion, the typical range was 4.68
– 7.772.141 Overall, then, it is fair to say that the typical relative
frequency of case uses to support a RULE is greater in opinions than in
briefs. The opposite is true for EXAMPLE case uses, where opinions use
them less frequently; the typical range for briefs being 1.70 – 3.84,
and for opinions 0.89 – 2.50. I discuss possible interpretations of
these differences in Part IV.
3. Briefs from Prevailing vs. Non-Prevailing Attorneys
Lawyers with winning cases—that is, cases where the law and
facts favor them—may have a tendency to use different arguments
than lawyers who have losing cases.

140

They were, however, statistically significant for

POLICY.

GENERALIZATION

and

141 Recall that I use ‘typical’ to refer to values falling within the interquartile
range; I refer to values above or below that as ‘unusually’ large or small.
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Figure 3 shows that there are a few significant differences in these
data. It is pretty easy to see that the briefs of prevailing parties
included more case uses of every kind. As Table 6 shows, that
difference was the only one between subgroups on case uses overall
that was practically and statistically different. The differences are
practically significant for QUOTATION (prevailing IQR 4.79 – 7.30 /
1000 words; non-prevailing IQR 2.85 – 6.28) and somewhat less so
for EXAMPLE (prevailing IQR 2.17 – 4.48; non-prevailing IQR 1.14 –
3.81) and POLICY (prevailing IQR 0.35 – 2.03; non-prevailing IQR 0 –
1.45).142

142

The differences were statistically significant for all types of case use except

GENERALIZATION.
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Figure 3. Briefs of Prevailing (n = 62) & Non-Prevailing (n
= 54) Parties143

Of course, this correlation tells us nothing about causation. We
cannot say that a brief with more case uses is more likely to cause a
court to rule in the party’s favor. Neither can we claim, based on these
data, that having a losing case makes it harder for advocates to find
cases to use in their arguments. And we cannot rule out other factors
that might cause both a party’s victory and a propensity to use more
cases in briefs. I discuss the implications of these findings in Part IV.
4. Briefs from Moving vs. Non-Moving Attorneys
It is possible that advocates in an offensive stance—those making
motions—use cases differently than advocates in a defensive stance—
143

See Table 6 in the Appendix for the underlying data.
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those opposing motions. As it happens, there were practically
significant differences between these two kinds of advocates in two
types of case use. Moving parties use RULE case uses more often than
non-moving parties (moving-party IQR 4.15 – 6.58 / 1000 words;
non-moving, 2.71 – 5.90). They also use QUOTATION more often
(moving-party IQR 4.33 – 7.34; non-moving, 2.92 – 6.22). I interpret
these findings further in Part IV.
Figure 4. Briefs Making (n = 68) or Opposing (n = 62)
Motions144

5. S.D.N.Y. Artifacts vs. Other Jurisdictions
Recall that fully ninety-six of the 199 artifacts in this study come
144

See Table 7 in the Appendix for the underlying data.

180

The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute

Vol. 25

from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. This is a function of that court sitting in the traditional
publishing center of the country. A random selection of copyright
cases is much more likely to present examples from there than from
any other district. Is it possible that artifacts from this copyright-rich
jurisdiction would exhibit case-use characteristics different than
those from other jurisdictions?
Figure 5. Artifacts from S.D.N.Y. (n = 96) or Other Courts
(n = 103)145

I used the Southern District as the basis for my comparison, as
only six artifacts from this study that were from the Second Circuit
145

See Table 8 in the Appendix for underlying data.
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were not from that district, and I expected that other districts courts
in the Second Circuit might be more like district courts in general than
they are like the Southern District. I examined whether the practices
of advocates and judges in this court differed from those in other parts
of the country.146 Figure 5 displays my findings.
As it happens, there are some significant differences between
authors writing in the Southern District of New York and those
writing elsewhere. The differences in QUOTATION (S.D.N.Y. IQR 4.33
– 7.95; other courts, 3.60 – 6.19) and POLICY (S.D.N.Y. IQR 0.49 –
1.98; other courts, 0.11 – 1.55) appear practically significant.147
Because this study focused on one kind of argument before these
courts—fair use in copyright cases—we cannot say from these data
whether the propensity to use cases more as QUOTATION and POLICY
in the Southern District of New York is restricted only to cases of this
kind or runs the gamut of cases before that court. I interpret these
findings in Part IV.
B. OTHER Case Uses
Everything old is new again, they say. After tackling Research
Question 2 in the previous section, I want to return to Research
Question 1. Based on the pilot study described in Part II, I chose the
coding categories that I have been discussing in Part III. It would be
fair for the reader to ask, however, how many of the units later coded
in the study did not fall into any of the categories I previously
identified in the pilot study. Perhaps we overlooked some category in
the pilot study that we should have had from the beginning? Recall
that coders applied the OTHER code to indicate that the author
appeared to be using a case for something other than, or in addition
to, the five categories I identified in the pilot study: RULE,
GENERALIZATION, POLICY, EXAMPLE and QUOTATION. As the QUOTATION
code commonly appeared in all case uses, regardless of the rational or
tactical appeal the author appeared to be making, I decided to review
instances of OTHER that appeared in conjunction with the four rational
appeals, and those of OTHER that appeared alone or only with
QUOTATION.
To prepare this section, I reviewed all the case uses coded as
Comparing artifacts from the Second Circuit (n = 99) with those from
other circuit-court territories (n = 100) produced similar results. Comparing
artifacts from the Ninth Circuit (n = 38) with those from other circuit-court
territories (n = 161) did not produce statistically or practically significant
differences.
147 Differences between those authors on POLICY, EXAMPLE, and QUOTATION
are all statistically significant.
146
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OTHER and the coder notes associated with them to see if any common
(or uncommon but still interesting) uses appeared among them. Of
the 5638 coding units, 637 or 11.3% received an OTHER code, while
only 383 or 6.8% were coded either as QUOTATION, as OTHER, or as
both without also being coded as RULE, GENERALIZATION, POLICY, or
EXAMPLE. This examination is less systematic and more preliminary
than the previous section, and so I will avoid making many
quantitative or comparative assessments.148
First, the most common OTHER use, present in nearly a quarter of
them and commonly associated with the one or more of the four
rational appeals, was what I call the ‘stitched application’ or ‘stitched
quote.’ Next in frequency, at around 6%, was what I call the ‘parting
quote’ or ‘parting cite,’ a tactical appeal. Four rational appeals
appeared in between 2% and 4.5% of the OTHER units: distinguishing
a case, citation to an earlier opinion in the instant case, use of a case
to interpret another case’s holding or a statute, and use of a case to
assert some non-legal fact about the world. I discuss these uses briefly
below.

1. The Stitched Quote or Application
One OTHER case use stood out as being very frequent, marking
some 24% of all case uses in the study. I call it the ‘stitched quote’ or
‘stitched application.’ It was widely dispersed, appearing at least once
in ninety-three different artifacts. In the stitched quotation form, the
advocate would make a claim about the instant case, weaving it
together with a quotation, again usually from an authoritative case. In
this situation, the case use was also coded with one of the other
rational appeals. An example will be helpful.
In the quoted material below, the author, a secondary user and
defendant opposing a motion for preliminary injunction made by Fox
Broadcasting Company, the rights holder, discussed the fourth fairuse factor. The suit was before the District Court for the Central
District of California. The second sentence of the excerpt shows a
Note first that I concluded that around 4% of the case uses coded OTHER
probably should not have been. Often, this was because one of the two
original coders did not see a rational appeal or QUOTATION, marking the unit
as OTHER, but later agreed in conference with the other coder that one of the
rational appeals was present. In the future, using these methods, it might be
wise to ask the original coders to remove the OTHER code in this instance. It’s
also true that coders may have missed uses of cases other than the four
rational appeals that I identified above because their attention was focused
specifically on those four. Future research will have to address that
possibility.
148
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stitched quote/application, where the author asserted that Fox had a
burden but finished the sentence with a quotation of a Supreme Court
case, Sony.
12.07.71 CU14–CU16149
The fourth factor requires consideration of “the
effect of the [defendant’s] use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 107; CU14 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 590 (1994). Because the consumer’s use is
noncommercial, Fox bears the burden to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm exists.” CU15 Sony, 464 U.S.
at 451; CU16 Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral
Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“when the use is noncommercial, the copyright owner
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is ‘some meaningful likelihood of future
harm’”).
Just as in Sony, however, Fox “fail[s] to carry [its]
burden . . .” 464 U.S. at 451. In Sony, the content
owners argued, in much the same vein as Fox here,
that their economic advertising model was in severe
danger and that a huge threat existed that, if the VCR
were permitted, there would be an end to all television
programming as we know it. As set forth in the Rapp
Declaration, the entertainment industry has a habit of
claiming that the sky is falling when new technology is
introduced. Rapp Decl. ¶¶41-57. As history now shows,
the frantic claims (“Boston Strangler”) of doom were
wrong. The Court in Sony considered all such
arguments and concluded that Universal had failed to
carry its burden. It endorsed the district court’s view
that Universal’s evidence of harm in that case was
“speculative” and/or “minimal.” 464 U.S. at 454.
From the stitched quote, the reader could not tell whether Sony
stated a rule to the effect that a copyright owner bears the burden of
proving market harm when the secondary user shows its use was noncommercial. The coders here might have inferred that it stood for that
rule based on the citation to and quotation from a different opinion,
Hustler Magazine, but that opinion was not binding upon this court.
The coders therefore did not code Sony as a RULE. They did however,
149

Footnote omitted.
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code it as an EXAMPLE, based on the author’s use of it in the second
paragraph.150
An author might use the same pithy phrase in a stitched
application as a rational appeal by couching conclusions about the
instant case in the actual words of a prior, often authoritative opinion;
and as a parting quote, where only the value as a tactical appeal is
evident. Compare these two excerpts:
18.03.37 CU64
Moreover, Defendant’s copying of the Photograph was
unnecessary to achieve Hearst’s news reporting purpose.
As noted by Judge Easterbrook in CU64 Kienitz v. Sconnie
Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014), “[t]he fair-use
privilege under § 107 is not designed to protect lazy
appropriators.” In this case, there were at least four legal
alternatives available to Defendant which did not include
the “lazy appropriation” of Otto’s work: (1) Hearst could
have published its informative story without any photo
whatsoever; (2) Hearst could have published the
Article using other photographs of President
Trump . . . .151
This excerpt is from a rights holder’s brief, the part of the argument
addressing the third fair-use factor, how much of the original work
the secondary user took. The citation to the Kienitz case (which was
not binding before this New York district court) stopped a bit short of
being a RULE, as it did not define what counts as ‘lazy,’ and this was
the first reference to that case in the brief. Nevertheless, the author
proceeded to present instant facts that the author believed would
paint the secondary user as a lazy appropriator. Compare the second
excerpt.
A further example appears in artifact 13.08.1032. At the very end of the
secondary user’s fair-use argument, the point where it might have chosen to
balance the four factors, it concluded: “Taken together, the public-minded
and scholarly purpose of the [secondary uses] . . . compels a finding that the
public purpose of copyright law ‘would be better served by allowing the use
than by preventing it.’ Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251.” The quotation is from Blanch
v. Koons, a Second Circuit case binding on the district court in this artifact.
But we have no statement of any rule about balancing the factors from
Blanch nor any facts from Blanch to show how that case balanced the factors.
At most, this could perhaps be read as a policy statement (and indeed, that
is how we coded it) from a binding court stitched together with an assertion
about the instant case.
151 Citations to the record in the case omitted.
150
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15.05.00 CU14
The net result of this Court’s first factor analysis is
unavailing. On the one hand, the transformative
purpose and non-commercial nature of the Flyer
weigh in favor of Defendants. On the other hand,
Defendants did not need to use the Photograph in
order to effectuate their criticism, and the fair use
privilege “is not designed to protect lazy
appropriators.” Id. [citing Kienitz]
In this excerpt, from a court’s opinion in the Northern District of
Illinois, where Kienitz is binding, the court had previously cited the
case for a couple points unrelated to the one made here. But here, at
the close of the argument section, the judge stitched the quote from
Kienitz, the first time we see this language in the opinion, into a
statement about the instant case. Perhaps the judge wished only to
grab a pithy phrase from a cited case to wrap up the argument section.
In fact, uses of cases as stitched quotes and stitched applications
accounted for more of the OTHER uses in judges’ opinions (around
29%) than in advocates’ briefs (around 23%).
2. The Parting Quote or Citation
A common technique both among judges and advocates was what
I call the ‘parting quote’ or ‘parting citation.’ These were quotations
or citations to authorities that were either binding (and perhaps well
known) or offered pithy expressions with which an argument’s
proponent could end their argument. Making up more than 6% of the
OTHER case uses (and more than 1% of total case uses), this practice
was fairly widely dispersed, appearing in forty-five different artifacts.
Consider this example from the Southern District of New York,
which is the rights holder’s entire argument regarding the second fairuse factor:
17.06.115 CU 16–18
“Jimmy Smith Rap” is a Vivid and Personal
Recollection by Jimmy Smith of the Album.
Defendants claim that “Jimmy Smith Rap” is a “thin”
copyright because it is “a short statement of a
purportedly factual nature with a significant amount
of unprotected material.” (Def. Memo. pp. 14, 17).
Pound Cake does not simply copy the facts that the
record company provided champagne in the studio, or
that the A&R men told them what to record, but Jimmy
Smith’s subjective recollection and comments. As the
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Supreme Court stated in CU16 Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 344, 348 (1991):
“Others may copy the underlying facts from the
publication, not the precise words used to present
them”. Defendant’s reliance upon CU17 Swatch Grp.
Mgmt. Serv. Ltd. is misplaced because the Court there
was faced with the publication of a recording of a
financial meeting at which non-copyrightable financial
facts and figures were announced. There was no
personal expression or comment involved.
Jimmy Smith Rap is clearly a creative expression
which lies “close to the core of copyright protective
purposes.” CU18 Campbell supra, at 586. The second
factor therefor favors Plaintiffs.
Here, CU16 supports a RULE statement from a Supreme Court
case, which the brief’s authors implied is inconsistent with the
secondary user’s conduct described in the previous sentence. CU17 is
an EXAMPLE used to distinguish a Second Circuit precedent previously
cited by the secondary user. But what is the purpose of citing
Campbell, another Supreme Court case, in the second paragraph? The
brief’s authors did not assert any rule, policy, or generalization from
Campbell; nor did they supply facts from Campbell to use it as an
example. This parting quote can only function to wrap up a discussion
of the instant case, apparently cloaking it in authoritative language
from a high court. It is difficult to see the rational value of the use of
this quotation, but it is not difficult to see the tactical or purely
persuasive value: Citing an authoritative case as a parting shot in an
argument segment may appear to give more weight to the writer’s
conclusion.
Again, use of cases as parting quotes and parting cites accounted
for more of the OTHER uses in opinions (around 8%) than in briefs
(around 6%).
3. Other Rational Appeals
The four miscellaneous rational appeals that occasionally
appeared in the OTHER units were distinguishing a case, citation to an
earlier opinion in the instant case, use of a case to interpret a statute
or another case’s holding, and use of a case to assert some non-legal
fact about the world. The first of these, distinguishing a case, typically
co-occurred with the EXAMPLE rational appeal for the simple reason
that they were typically used as counterexamples. Consider artifact
17.02.46, supporting the secondary user’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings on grounds of fair use, arguing that its work was a parody
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of The Grinch Who Stole Christmas.
17.02.46 CU30–31152
[The secondary user] did not merely use elements of
Grinch to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh. CU30 Campbell, 510
U.S. at 580. Therefore, the case that [the secondary
user] anticipates [the rights holder] will rely upon,
CU31 Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997), is
distinguishable. That [ . . .] decision, which affirmed a
preliminary injunction in favor of [the rights holder],
concerned a poetic account of the O.J. Simpson double
murder trial entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! A
Parody by Dr. Juice, which the [secondary user]
alleged was a fair use of the well-known The Cat in the
Hat by Dr. Seuss. Id., at 1396. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the [secondary user’s] argument that the work
at issue was a parody, finding that “the substance and
content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by the
focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J.
Simpson trial.” 109 F.3d at 1401. Here, in contrast, [the
secondary user’s] writing not only mimics Grinch’s
rhyming style, but the text has a critical bearing on the
substance and style of Grinch. [The secondary user]
did not randomly select any-old [sic] popular work to
tell a story about a topical news event, like the OJ
Simpson trial. The [secondary work] is a Christmasthemed work that conjures up Grinch and comments
on Grinch as part of a newly created original work of
authorship.
Here, the author anticipated that the rights holder’s opposition to this
motion would cite Dr. Seuss and distinguished it even before the
rights holder could strike. We coded this case use as an EXAMPLE,
because the author provided facts about Dr. Seuss and its outcome
and then explicitly contrasted it with the instant case. The vast
majority of case uses coded as OTHER that I found were distinguishing
were also coded as EXAMPLE.
An exception to that rule, and a poorly executed version of this
appeal, appears in artifact 17.07.32, where the entire discussion of the
second fair-use factor consists of these two sentences:

152
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17.07.32 CU10
The second factor (the nature of the copyrighted work
as creative and expressive and not factual)
indisputably weighs in [the rights holder’s] favor. The
Work is expressive and does not merely recite facts like
the names and addresses in a phone book. CU10 See,
e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 344-45 (1991).
This author had not cited Feist previously and never cited it directly
again. Probably the only way the coders would have recognized this as
an EXAMPLE is if one or both of them had known that Feist was a case
about copyrights in a telephone book. That did not happen, and they
coded it only as OTHER. But because I am familiar with Feist, I believe
the author intended this paragraph to distinguish the instant case
from Feist.153 As a consequence of the co-occurrence of EXAMPLE with
this kind of OTHER, I consider the latter a subcategory of the former.
In fact, given my sense that drawing case distinctions is very common
and expected, it’s possible that the coders in many instances just
coded them as EXAMPLE and never noted an OTHER use in the file. That
might explain the relative sparsity of this type of OTHER, which
appeared in only nineteen of the artifacts (less than 10%) in this study.
One rational appeal, evident in about 4% of the OTHER case uses
(and less than 1% of total case uses) was citation to an earlier opinion
in the instant case. So, for example, in 15.09.00 CU27 the judge cited
her own earlier opinion in the same case for a proposition upon which
she relied in her present opinion. This phenomenon occurred only
where a case had a sufficiently long history for there to be prior
published opinions, and only in nine (less than 5%) of the artifacts in
this study.154 Were I to revise the coding guide for this study, I would
likely give this type of case use its own category tag.
A third miscellaneous rational appeal is the use of a case to
interpret another case’s holding. This appeal marked less than 4% of
the OTHER case uses and was dispersed across only twenty-seven (less
than 14%) of the artifacts in this study. A good example is a footnote
in artifact 18.03.52, where the author attempted to discount cases
their opponent cited or rules their opponent derived from them.

153 Of course, that was not a fair-use case, and at this point in the fair-use
analysis, the advocate should be asserting how creative the original work is,
not whether it’s copyright-protected at all.
154 Case files 12.01, 12.05, 15.07, and 15.09.
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18.03.52 CU76–79
Plaintiff’s citation to CU76 Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.
v. H.R. Industries, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) is inapposite because the image at
issue in that case was used to introduce a section for
special effects advertisers and not for any of the
preamble uses in § 107 of the Copyright Act, and in any
event that decision was vacated by CU77 Richard
Feiner & Co., Inc. v. H.R. Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 901
(2d Cir. 1999).
Here, CU76 cited the trial-court opinion in Feiner and immediately
distinguished it on its facts. We coded it as EXAMPLE and OTHER
(distinguished). The author then cited the appellate opinion in Feiner
in CU77 to explain to the instant court the weight it should give to the
trial-court opinion: none. We coded it as EXAMPLE—because the facts
and outcome were known—and OTHER (interpretation). Anecdotally I
observed that advocates often distinguished their opponents’ cases in
footnotes, though I did not try to observe the practice systematically.
This is perhaps to downplay the presence of those cases in the author’s
brief, but it may be risky to commit one’s effort to distinguish the
opponent’s case to a part of the authors brief the reader may never
read. Other instances of interpretation include ones where the author
would comment on the history or importance of some inquiry.155
The final miscellaneous rational appeal was the use of a case to
assert some non-legal fact about the world. For example, several
artifacts cited Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,156 for the
proposition that paradigmatic fair uses like news reporting and
criticism are carried out for profit in the U.S., supporting the
argument that such activities do not automatically fail on the first fairuse factor.157 This type of OTHER appeared in only twenty case uses
across the whole study (less than 0.5%).
The six appeals discussed in this section accounted for more than
500 of the case uses that we marked as OTHER. There were a few other
peculiarities, including points where we simply could not figure out
why an author was citing a case, but they did not make up a
substantial portion of the OTHER case uses or of the total case uses.

E.g. 12.07.79 CU02 (asserting relevance of transformativeness in context
of a court decision before Campbell); 18.01.00 CU07 (citing a case that
stresses the importance of analysis of the first fair-use factor).
156 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
157 E.g., 12.05.00 CU03, 12.05.64 CU15, 15.06.166 CU11.
155
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IV.
Discussion
This study set out to begin answering the question: ‘How do
judges and advocates use cases in their arguments?’ It did so by asking
two specific research questions relating to a corpus of 199 artifacts,
the copyright fair-use arguments in fifty-five court opinions between
2012 and 2018 and the 144 advocates’ briefs that gave rise to them:
RQ1.

To what uses did the judges and attorneys put
citations to previous cases in their opinions and
briefs in the artifacts selected for study here?
RQ2. With what relative frequency did they use cases in
these ways?
This Part first discusses the answer to RQ1, then generally discusses
the extent to which the data here were consistent with the theory of
legal topoi Professor Provenzano and I advanced, described in Part I.
This Part also discusses the differences in relative frequencies of
certain types of case uses between opinions and briefs and between
briefs written by authors in different socio-legal positions. Finally, it
considers limitations of the study and suggests further research.
A. Uses Authors Made of Cases
The answer to Research Question 1 is that judges and advocates in
these artifacts tended to cite previous court opinions to make rational
appeals, the most common being to support the assertion of a rule,
policy, or generalization or to illustrate the application of a rule with
an example.
The most common use of a citation, though, was to support a
quotation from a cited case. This type of case use can be mixed in
terms of being a rational or tactical appeal.158 In many instances, this
was an empirical rational appeal, as that term is defined above.159
When authors cited cases to support their characterization of a rule,
generalization, or policy, for example, they commonly quoted some
language from the cited case in that support—that observation about
the cited text is empirical. A quotation offers rational advantages over
a brief or opinion writer’s paraphrase of the underlying authority:
Assuming the language is correctly quoted, the reader need not trust
the argument proponent’s interpretation of the language, as a
paraphrase would require them to do. The purely tactical (or purely
For the distinction between these types of appeals, see text accompanying
notes 23–25, supra.
159 See supra Part I.A.
158
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persuasive) value of language from an authoritative source was not
lost on authors, however, who sometimes appeared to use quotations
for no other reason than to cloak a statement about the instant case
in language and a citation from an authoritative source—what I have
described as the ‘parting quote.’160
The only purely tactical appeal commonly observed was in fact
this same parting quote or parting cite, where an author cited a case
when wrapping up an argument section. Often the case cited or
quoted was binding and influential, and often the author chose to
quote language that was pithy and stitched together with some
statement about the instant case. This type of case use does not
contribute to the cogency of an argument, but it may contribute to its
success. Of course, authors of these artifacts had many ways other
than citing cases to make tactical appeals, including using thoughtful
legal stylistic choices, storytelling, and other techniques.161 The
findings of this study do not suggest that the authors were not making
tactical appeals, just that they tended not to use citations to previous
opinions to do so. An extension of this study’s work could examine all
the tactical appeals in a set of artifacts.
Among artifacts in this study, uses of cases to support rule
statements, generalizations, policy arguments, examples, and
quotations varied in relation to their strength in the theory of legal
topoi.162 Uses with higher rational appeal according to that theory—
empirical appeals like RULE and QUOTATION—were more common
than those with modest or lesser appeal—conventional appeals like
EXAMPLE and values-based appeals like POLICY.
I propose that this hierarchy is based on the argument
proponent’s goal of appearing to mobilize fewer interpretive
resources in making the argument. In the terms of linguistic and
philosophical pragmatics, this is the extent to which they must
account for a variety of possible meanings—or possible implicatures—
and rule out all those that will not apply.163
See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 27 and sources cited there.
162 See supra Part I.A.
163 Brian N. Larson, Bridging Rhetoric and Pragmatics with Relevance
Theory, in RELEVANCE AND IRRELEVANCE: THEORIES, FACTORS AND
CHALLENGES 69, 79 (Jan Straßheim & Hisashi Nasu eds., 2018) (defining
‘explicatures’ as “inferences about disambiguation of word senses and
reference resolution” or “identification of explicit content”) (citations and
quotations omitted); id. at 73 (defining ‘implicatures’ as “conclusions that
the Hearer draws about what the Speaker implied, suggested, or meant that
are different from what the Speaker said, which is closely related to the
160
161
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When a writer presents an argument based on the actual words of
a rule from an authoritative text (like a binding court opinion), the
writer apparently interprets the text less than they would to apply
some prior case precedent without a rule. As an empirical matter, the
rule statement either is or is not in the authoritative text. The words
of the rule statement are usually relatively small in number—often
just a sentence; they are usually couched in the language of the law,
using applicable terms of art; and they usually provide a fairly clear
statement in the form of operative facts ⟶ normative consequence.
Alternative hypotheses about the meaning of the rule—possible
implicatures—are relatively small in number.164 The use of RULE is an
empirical rational appeal, in that characterization of a rule as some
set of operative facts leading to a normative consequence permits
authors (after offering evidence of the operative facts) to move
inexorably to the conclusion they desire. It requires no further
interpretation. This analysis explains the relative frequency both of
RULE and QUOTATION case uses.
Applying an authoritative case precedent as a legal analogy using
the common-law method, however, is considerably more complex.
The EXAMPLE case use follows the pattern of legal analogy: A previous
case had similar facts and came out a certain way; this case should
thus come out the same way. This form of reasoning is conventional
in law, though it is not in all fields.165 It is empirical in the sense that
it contains an assertion that the law and facts cited are indeed present
in an authoritative text. But here, the argument’s proponent must
draw from among all the facts in the cited and instant cases those
comparisons that are relevant to application of the law and conclude
that any differences are not so relevant as to distinguish the
precedent. The proponent may or may not feel the need to apply what
Professor Schauer refers to as “categories of assimilation”166—that is,
they may or may not feel the need to propose a covering rule that
brings the instant case into alignment with the cited case.167 If they do
so, however, they have the option to draw the category of assimilation
at various levels of abstraction, all of which the precedent case may
equally strongly implicate.168 Alternative hypotheses about the
conventional meaning of the words uttered”) (citations and quotations
omitted).
164 Though there may still be very many.
165 WEINREB, supra note 1, at 8–9. See supra Part I.A.
166 Schauer, supra note 1, at 582.
167 For use of the term ‘covering rule,’ see WEINREB, supra note 1, at 61 n.31.
168 I noted previously:
Schauer offers an example to help define what he means by

2021

Precedent as Rational Persuasion

193

meaning of the text are considerably more numerous, and the need to
choose imposes higher interpretive costs on the author and calls on
the reader to trust the author more. The authors of the artifacts in this
study perhaps recognized, therefore, that conventional appeals based
on legal analogy inspire less confidence than those based on brightline rules. Case uses coded as EXAMPLE appeared less frequently than
RULE, but more frequently than other types.
Making a policy argument moves even deeper into interpretive
territory. On the model discussed above, policy arguments in the law
are values-based arguments, and they require the greatest
interpretive effort on the parts of authors and readers to connect the
arguments about the instant case.169 They are not so much arguments
about what the law is, but rather why it is or what it should be. The
argument’s proponent may choose from a large number of texts,
including ones not normally authoritative in law, such as literary and
religious texts, may search for motivations behind statements of rules
and decisions in previous cases, and so on. The possible implicatures
the author could draw from such materials are vast in number,
making it very difficult to reject most meaning determinations and
settle on one. Accepting a policy argument requires the reader to
repose considerable trust in the author’s interpretive performance.
Uses of cases to support arguments coded as POLICY were
substantially less common than the other types so far discussed.
Finally, we have the category of GENERALIZATION, the least
frequently used, which is complicated by a couple problems. First, the
coders on this project found it difficult to agree when to assign this
code.170 The category should capture argumentative uses of cited cases
categories of assimilation. He asks us to “[i]magine a faculty meeting
considering a request from a student for an excused absence from an
examination in order to attend the funeral of his sister.” Assuming
the faculty grants the request without comment, for what is it a
precedent? Can students expect to be excused “to attend the funerals
of grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews, close
friends, and pets”? The answer, he tells us, depends on how broadly
the category of assimilation is drawn. The decedent in the first case
could be characterized as “a sibling, a relative, a blood relative, and
one with whom the student has a ‘meaningful relationship.’”
Larson, supra note 1, at 680–81 (quoting Schauer, supra note 1, at 577–79)
(notes omitted).
169 See supra Part I.B.
170 Initial pairwise observed agreement (86.62%) and Cohen’s Kappa (0.20)
were lower on this category than any other. For discussion of inter-rater
reliability on this study, see supra, note 122.
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that “support an assertion about what courts often, usually, or
generally do.”171 It was common, however, for one coder to see an
expression like “commercial use generally weighs against fair use” as
a generalization while another might see it as a rule (possibly subject
to exception or countervailing considerations). Second, the
GENERALIZATION is something like a cross between an EXAMPLE and a
RULE, making its rational argumentative appeal less certain. Given
enough EXAMPLEs of cases similar in a certain way to the instant case
that come out a certain way, the author or reader might attempt to
universalize the similarity as the operative facts of a RULE statement.
Here, the GENERALIZATIONs appeared to happen in cases where the
author was not quite prepared to claim that the statement was a rule.
On the other hand, GENERALIZATION sometimes appeared in case uses
where the author cited only one case; it’s difficult to see how a single
example supports a generalization across cases.
In summary, uses by authors of cases in this study were generally
consistent with the hierarchy of rational appeals that Professor
Provenzano and I previously described, with RULE and QUOTATION
units, which make empirical appeals, each about twice as common as
EXAMPLE units; EXAMPLE units, which make conventional appeals,
about twice as common as POLICY units; and POLICY units, which make
values-based arguments, quite rare. The GENERALIZATION units were
rare even by those standards, though, probably because they are
neither fish nor fowl (that is, neither RULE nor EXAMPLE) from writers’
and readers’ perspectives.
In short, assuming in each case that the argument’s proponent has
accurately represented the authorities on which the argument relies,
the reader must trust the proponent more to have correctly
interpreted those authorities if the argument is values-based or
conventional than if the argument is empirical. It may be, however,
that advocates and judges choose to use cases, at least in part, due to
considerations other than persuasive effect.172 In other words,
perhaps the most frequent is not necessarily the most effective. This
question would benefit from further research of the kind described
below.
B. Variations Across Genres or Communities
This study showed that there were practically and statistically
significant differences in relative frequencies of the types of case uses
described here depending on whether the author was a judge or
171
172

See supra Part I.B.
I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
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advocate, prevailing or non-prevailing advocate, party moving for or
opposing a motion, and writing in the Southern District of New York
or elsewhere. As Toulmin noted, argumentation forms are fielddependent.173 Genre theory suggests that the typical communicative
or argumentative response to a typical social situation will vary with
the discourse community in which it occurs.174 Swales offered some
defining characteristics of a discourse community.175 Considerably
more research may help to explain the difference, but I offer some
speculations here to set the agenda for that research.
First, why might judges use RULE more frequently and EXAMPLE
less frequently than advocates? When judges write opinions to justify
their decisions, they are in a considerably different position than the
advocates who argue that the judges should take one position or
another. The judge’s decision has binding effect on the parties, until
and unless one or more of them appeal the decision. But most appeals
fail, probably because within the options available, judges usually
provide plausible justifications for the outcomes they select.
Advocates, on the other hand, petition the judge to select their
arguments over those of their opponents. They may feel it is necessary
to provide a wider range of arguments to buttress their positions.
Judges also represent institutional interests, and at least in this
sample, they are appointed for life tenure. As a consequence, they may
wish for their decisions to be perceived as logically compelled rather
than a judgment call (so to speak) between the positions of the parties.
Judges in this situation may seek to appear as a matter of institutional
credibility to engage less in interpretation of the law and more in its
application. As I explained above, the QUOTATION and RULE case uses
arise in the empirical legal topos, which is to say that they require least
interpretation. Judges use cases to set out legal rules more often than
advocates do.
Advocates, on the other hand, offer more EXAMPLES, certainly in
an effort to guide the judge in interpreting the rules that the court
must apply. In addition to seeking to make decisions that appear
logically compelled, judges may be more reluctant to rely on examples
than advocates because the legal effect of a precedent case may be
arguable enough to result in a higher likelihood of reversal on appeal.
He noted: “[t]he sorts of evidence relevant in [legal] cases of different
kinds will naturally be very variable. To establish negligence in a civil case,
willful intent in a case of murder, the presumption of legitimate birth: each
of these will require appeal to evidence of different kinds.” Toulmin, supra
note 28, at 16.
174 SWALES, supra note 71, at 24–27.
175 Id.
173
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So, for example, a trial-court judge may be concerned that the court
of appeals will distinguish a case upon which the trial-court judge
relies for an example. It is an easy matter for the appeals court to say
that the cited case is not relevantly similar, or is relevantly dissimilar,
to the instant, so that the holding in the cited case is not compelled in
the instant case. For the appeals court instead to contradict the trial
court’s statement of a rule might require the appeals court to offer an
exception and a rationale for it.
One reviewer of this article suggested that an advocate trying to
persuade the judge might use EXAMPLEs as a way of showing the judge
that their peers have already ruled the advocate’s way in other cases,
making the judge feel safer in making that determination in the
instant case.176 Judges, on the other hand, are not motivated to show
that any herd mentality governs them but rather wish it to appear that
legal rules compel their decisions.
Prevailing advocates used QUOTATION, EXAMPLE, and POLICY
significantly more often than non-prevailing advocates. I have
described these differences as both statistically and practically
significant. The former is a conventional measure and the latter a
statistical threshold that I selected for this study. One question that
immediately presents itself is whether readers would note such
differences. That requires further study. If these differences are
visible to the skilled legal reader (like a judge or other advocate), it
may be true to say that a brief with certain characteristics looks like
what could fairly be called a ‘losing brief,’ potentially giving it
diminished credibility. But this study does not provide evidence that
losing briefs cause litigation losses. It may just as plausibly be that
weak cases make only certain types of arguments practicable. There
may also be some other cause(s) mediating both the form of the briefs
and the outcomes of the cases.
Moving parties’ advocates used RULE and QUOTATION more often
than non-moving parties’ advocates. These differences may well be a
function of the burden placed on the moving party: to offer sufficient
legal authority for its position and show the court that it is entitled to
relief. The non-moving party need only show that the moving party’s
argument is sufficiently infirm so as to make the relief it seeks
unavailable. As a consequence, the non-moving parties may be
focusing their arguments on attacking the arguments of the moving
briefs rather than attempting to make independent arguments relying
on other cited cases. Nevertheless, we might expect that the nonPersonal correspondence with Professor Kevin Bennardo. Copy on file
with the author.
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moving party would need to call on authorities for legal rules just as
frequently as the moving party, and the difference observed here
prompts inquiry into their practices.
Finally, the question of geography is an interesting one. The
authors in the Southern District of New York—a jurisdiction
commonly associated with copyright actions—used more QUOTATION
and POLICY than authors in other jurisdictions. Their greater use of
EXAMPLE was also statistically but not practically significant. There is
an extent to which we might expect practice to be fairly consistent
across federal districts, but I suspect too that no one would be
surprised to hear that lawyers in Texas, for example, write differently
than lawyers in California. The community of lawyers practicing
before the federal bar may well have subcommunities, and as genres
are properties of (sub)communities, it may well be that certain
practices become commonplace in some but not others. It may also
be that copyright cases in SDNY draw judges and advocates who are
more experienced or interested in copyright matters and that this
conditions in some way the kinds of arguments they make.
C. Limitations & Future Research
This study is a start toward answering the big question: How do
judges and advocates use cited cases in their arguments? But it is also
subject to some limitations. First, it looked only at artifacts relating to
one subject matter in the law, focused on one level of the federal
judiciary. This was a deliberate choice, because other legal subject
matter and other levels of court might exhibit systematically different
practices. The only way to see that is to study them separately. The
choice of copyright—a fact-intensive field with roots in judge-made
policy—might have inflated the extent to which advocates and judges
made use of EXAMPLE and POLICY here. Study of a more rule-based
area of the law would help to assess the magnitude of any such
difference. I suggest too that further study should examine artifacts
from appellate cases, initially at least, in the same field—copyright
law—but also more broadly. Appellate judges have different roles and
are subject to different constraints than district-court judges. They
may also tend to have different kinds of experience before reaching
the bench.
I have described some differences noted above as practically and
statistically different. Others can check my math on statistical and
practical significance by examining the data.177 It is impossible to say
now, however, whether the typically trained legal reader would detect
177

See Larson, supra note 12.
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those differences, whether I have categorized them as practically
significant or not. The question matters: If readers recognize the
differences between briefs written in the winning and losing styles
suggested by these findings, lawyers would be well-advised, whatever
the quality of their cases, to emulate the briefs of prevailing advocates.
If the distinction is invisible to readers, it may still be of theoretical
interest without being something that advocates lose sleep over.
Experimental study—exposing readers to different densities of case
uses in short texts—would be valuable to answer that question.
As for the other potentially different communities of authors—
opinions vs. briefs, moving vs. non-moving parties, SDNY authors vs.
others—and the differences in their practices those communities
mediate, further research might explore judges’ and advocates’
practices using social-scientific methods such as qualitative
interviews, surveys, and ethnography. These efforts could provide
clearer insight into the differences.
The data from this study also have further insights to offer. The
corpus and data here provide an opportunity to examine both the
arguments advocates make and the reactions of their opponents and
judges. For example, some scholars debate whether using a legal
analogy without asserting a deductive rule in its application can result
in a cogent argument. This study has indeed identified instances
where authors have used legal analogies (EXAMPLES here) without
rules. A deeper qualitative examination of these data will show
whether such arguments exhibit apparent flaws in reasoning and
whether they generate normative censure from opposing advocates
and judges.178 Similar qualitative deep dives are possible regarding
the use of rule and policy arguments more generally. Case uses also
illustrate questions of legal theory by allowing the researcher to show
how a case the moving party cites elicits a response from the opposing
party and then the judge. This would meaningfully extend a previous
study that looked at the uptake of cases cited in briefs—their
‘stickiness’—by examining whether judges cited the same cases.179 The
findings would be important for legal theory and practice given the
role of adversarial argumentation as a truth-finding mechanism and
its relation to the dialectic nature of legal argumentation.180 Other
avenues open to exploration with the data already collected for this
study are whether the patterns are different for cited cases that are
binding vs. non-binding and for court opinions that are appealable vs.
I’m preparing the findings of that study now.
See Bennardo & Chew, supra, note 52.
180 I’m preparing the findings of that study now, as well.
178
179
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those that are not.
Conclusion
This article answered two research questions, puzzle pieces in the
larger originating question of how judges and advocates make use of
cases in their arguments. Though this is the first published
systematic, empirical study that explores how lawyers and judges use
cases in their arguments, it should not be the last. Legal theorists can
make productive use of the corpus of artifacts and data from this
study, and they can conduct their own studies with the methods
developed here, or with their own extensions of them.
All these findings are significant in that they characterize the
practices of these authors in such a way that they may inform
metanormative legal theory. This study showed that the advocates
and judges here exhibited the preferences that the theory of legal
topoi expected: a preference for the empirical topos, followed by the
conventional, and finally the values-based topos. And the findings
here showed the magnitude of those preferences.
These findings have significance for lawyers, particularly those
findings that suggest the brief of a party with a good case might look
different than the brief of a party with a bad case. I would caution
advocates not to change their writing practices until we can see
whether these apparent differences appear in other types of cases and
whether they are detectable by legal readers.
Finally, these findings have significance for legal pedagogy. To the
extent that teachers of legal theory and writing emphasize a group of
approaches on the metanormative grounds that they are best
practices, those teachers should know the practical norms to which
the profession will expect students to conform once they get out of law
school. To the extent that law teachers’ pet methods and
metanormative theories differ from the realities of practice, they
should at least give students a heads up that what they must do in law
school classes may look different—perhaps very different—from what
practical norms expect them to do.
The findings in this study invite further research in at least three
areas. The first relates to the methods described particularly in this
article. I might call the second area the study of ‘reader reception’ of
the kinds of texts studied here. And the third takes the rhetorical
perspective, seeking to understand how authors think their
construction of legal arguments will persuade their audiences.
First, scholars should use the methods described here to study
arguments in other parts of the law: substantive law other than
copyright, courts other than federal courts, levels other than the trial
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court, etc. It may also be interesting to see how the methods apply to
analyses outside the litigation context: For example, genres like the
office memo, to the extent it still exists.181 If the patterns observed
here are borne out there, they point to broad practical norms across
American legal practice. If they are not, the findings here may
describe only the practices of the types of authors studied here, and
we should be able to account for the differences in practical norms
based on differences in the relevant communities of argument
proponents.182
Second, scholars should examine whether the differences in
argumentative practice—say between advocates who prevail before
the court and those who do not—are noticeable to legal readers. A
researcher could begin this work using surveys, presenting skilled
legal readers with texts that vary in the relative frequency of use of the
various types of case use. It should be possible experimentally to
determine whether they even notice the differences described above.
Qualitative interviews might also be useful for understanding legal
readers’ perceptions of these differences, if any.
Finally, scholars should explore the decisions that proponents of
legal arguments make while deciding what is the best means to
persuade their audiences, whether it is the court persuading the
parties that they should not appeal its decision or the appeals court
that it should not reverse it, or it is the advocate seeking or opposing
the grant of some relief from the court. Legal argumentation is
dialogic, and understanding how these arguments’ proponents
anticipate responses from their audiences has important implications
for legal theory, practice, and pedagogy.

See Kirsten K. Davis, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated:
Reading and Writing Objective Legal Memoranda in a Mobile Computing
Age, 92 OR. L. REV. 471, 482 (2013) (critiquing critiques of the “traditional
legal memorandum”).
182 Of course, further studies might also uncover flaws in this study or its
methods.
181

2021

Precedent as Rational Persuasion

201

Appendix
Section A explains how to obtain the coding guide and dataset
associated with this article. Section B offers a simple statistical
description of the dataset. Section C explains the use of statistical tests
and the data presentation in this article. Section D supplies the tables
upon which the figures above are based.
A. Data Repository
“Coding Guide & Replication Data for ‘Precedent as Rational
Persuasion’” is a dataset in the Texas Data Repository including the
coding guide discussed in this article and all the original textual
artifacts and data from which the findings in this study derive.183
Those materials are available for other researchers, who may use
them to replicate, criticize, or extend this study.
Any researcher can obtain these materials by navigating to
https://doi.org/10.18738/T8/SXNR02, selecting all the files, and
clicking the “Download” button. The data repository will generate a
.ZIP file that the researcher can download. The downloaded file is
between 124 and 125 megabytes in size. Uncompressing the .ZIP file
places the applicable files into a file structure that makes them easier
to navigate than they are on the data repository website.
B. Description of Dataset for this Study
The corpus for this study included sections of arguments from and
related to fifty-five court opinions, and for each opinion, between zero
and six briefs.184 I called the opinion and its related briefs a ‘case file.’
In all, the fifty-five case files included a total of 199 artifacts. The
histogram in Figure 6 shows how many case files had each number of
artifacts associated with it.185
See generally Larson, supra note 12.
It may be surprising that there was a single instance where we coded an
opinion but none of its briefs. Case file 14.06 amazingly had only one artifact,
the court’s opinion in Calibrated Success, Inc. v. Charters, 72 F. Supp. 3d
763 (E.D. Mich. 2014). All three relevant briefs (ECF Nos. 11, 15, and 16)
mention fair use, but none has a single citation to a court opinion in support
of that discussion!
185 The outliers here deserve a brief mention: For case file 14.06, which had
only one artifact, see supra note 184. Case file 14.03 had only two artifacts,
the court’s opinion in Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014),
and the defendant’s motion, Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Nov 26, 2013). The plaintiff did not
oppose the defendant’s motion with a brief. On the other end of the spectrum
is White v. West Publishing Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), an
183
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Of the opinions, twenty-one (38%) ruled on fair-use issues for the
rights holders; twenty-five (45%) for secondary users; and nine (16%)
went partially for one side and partially for the other.186
Because many of the businesses engaged in producing and
distributing creative works in the United States are based in New York
and California, federal districts sitting in those states were sources of
a majority of the opinions, while several other districts were also
represented, as Table 1 shows. While evaluating the findings, I
considered whether artifacts from these courts reflected differences
from those from elsewhere.187
Figure 6. Number of Artifacts Coded per Case File (N = 55)
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opinion precipitated by three motions for summary judgment (one by the
plaintiff and one by each of two defendants), with a brief on each side of each
motion.
186 Failure to add to 100% is due to rounding. We did not record data for
whether an opinion favored the moving or non-moving party because the
opinions frequently adjudicated cross motions for summary judgment or
dismissal, making both parties effectively moving and non-moving.
187 Part III.A.5.

2021

Precedent as Rational Persuasion

203

The portions of those artifacts that we coded—all related to the
question of fair use—totaled 767,980 words and represented 8225
raw citations to court opinions. They cited a total of 529 different
court opinions. Table 2 summarizes statistics relating to case files and
shows the mean number of words per case file was 13,963. The mean
number of raw citations per case file was 150.
C. Statistics & Data Presentation
I have avoided tables of data in the text of this article, preferring
to reserve them for the Appendix. Most of the tables show
interquartile ranges of the variables they present. I present the data
this way because the IQR provides a better impression of the typical
range of values for a variable. The interquartile range is the range
within which the central 50% of the values fall; below the lower value
are roughly 25% of the observations, and above the higher value are
roughly 25% of the observations.188 I use these boundaries in this
article when describing a value as ‘unusually low’ or ‘unusually high.’
My rationale is that it is helpful for the reader to know more than just
whether a value is above average—around half the values in a nonskewed distribution with few or no outliers will be—or below average.
In this article, if I say a value is ‘unusually high (low),’ I mean it is
outside the IQR and therefore higher (lower) than 75% of the values.
Similarly, when I refer to a value as ‘typical,’ I mean only to say that it
falls within the IQR. Calculating IQRs also permits visualization of
data with a box-and-whisker plot, something I use in the article and
explain upon its first use.189
Some of the findings presented in Part III show differences
between subsets or categories of the data: for example, between briefs
and opinions, between texts from the Southern District of New York
and from other districts, etc. I focus the presentation of comparative
findings in Part III and the discussion in Part IV on differences that I
describe as both statistically and practically significant.
Statistical significance really just measures the probability that
the difference observed in two samples accurately measures a
difference that exists in the broader population. In short, it measures
how likely it is that the difference between the two sample values is
real. The result is usually expressed with a p-value, with the threshold
I say ‘roughly’ because I performed all statistical tests using R Studio, and
the quartile functions in R Studio count the median value (if it exists in the
observations and is not calculated as the mean of the two values in the middle
of the sample) as part of the second and third quartiles. It gets counted twice,
and consequently, ‘roughly’ is appropriate here.
189 See supra note 138.
188
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for significance (called alpha) established by the researcher and
commonly accepted to be 0.05 in much social science research.
Parametric tests of significance require that the sample have a
Gaussian—sometimes called ‘normal’—distribution. I used the
Shapiro-Wilk test to assess whether the categories here appeared in a
Gaussian distribution.190 Case uses overall and QUOTATION case uses
were in Gaussian distributions, but the coding categories RULE,
GENERALIZATION, POLICY, and EXAMPLE were not. For categories in
Gaussian distribution, I used the parametric Welch Two Sample t-test
for statistical significance, and for non-Gaussian distributions the
Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction, each with alpha =
0.05.
‘Practical significance,’ as I use the term, just means that a
statistically significant difference in the measurement of two samples
may have some practical importance. The traditional statistical
measure for the latter is a test for the effect size of the difference
between the two samples. There are many possible tests for effect size.
Unfortunately, they are often represented in arbitrary numerical
ranges that are hard for the layperson to interpret. Perhaps the easiest
to make sense of is Vargha and Delany’s A,191 which is what I have
chosen to use here.192 In principle, this statistic expresses the
probability that a randomly selected member of one sample will be
higher than a randomly selected member of the other sample. The
higher the value of A, the greater the effect size. I’ve selected a
threshold value of 0.62 (rounded to two decimal points) as the cut-off
for practical significance.193 All of the differences reported here that
are practically significant are also statistically significant.
As it happens, the threshold I have chosen for practical
I performed all statistical tests using R Studio.
András Vargha & Harold D. Delaney, A Critique and Improvement of the
“CL” Common Language Effect Size Statistics of McGraw and Wong, 25 J.
EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 101, 102 (2000).
192 This statistic bears a linear relationship to Cliff’s delta, with which some
readers may be more familiar. Id. at 104.
193 The researcher-selected threshold is always arbitrary, but there is not a
conventionally accepted value here as there is with alpha. Vargha and Delany
propose that the effect size is “small” where A ≥ 0.56, “medium” where A ≥
0.64, and “large” where A ≥ 0.71. Id. at 106. In my view, any medium or large
effect size would be practically significant, but I also believe it’s wise to relax
that standard slightly for purposes of this study. The best practice going
forward would be to study how big the effect size needs to be before a reader
is likely to perceive any difference in an argument based solely on the size of
this effect.
190
191
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significance (A ≥ 0.62) corresponds closely to an informal visual test
that the reader without statistical training can apply to the box plots
in the figures in Part III. Generally, a difference is practically
significant when the median in one category is very near or beyond
the end of the IQR in another category. Take the example of the RULE
category in Figure 2. There, the median value for briefs is 4.85, just
above the lower end of the IQR for opinions (4.68). In other words,
above that threshold are about 75% of the opinions and only 50% of
the briefs.194 Even though the median for briefs is just above the lower
end of the IQR for opinions, I would count it practically significant
because of the apparent overlap in Figure 2. This eyeballing of the
differences generally corresponds to the statistical test of practical
significance.195

194

Note that in this case, one could look just as easily at the median for opinions
(6.23), which is just below the upper end of the IQR for briefs (6.37). If the
distribution of either statistic had more skew, this reciprocal relationship might not
hold.
195
This is a heuristic method, of course, and there is no statistical reality that compels
this correspondence in any given instance. Vargha and Delaney’s A is not
isomorphic with the IQR for the values.
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D. Tables
Table 1. Source Courts of Opinion Artifacts in this Study (N
= 55)
Court
C.D. Cal.
D. Az.
D. Colo.
D. Mass.
D. Md.
D. Mont.
D.P.R.
E.D. Mich.
E.D. Mo.
E.D. Tex.
M.D. Fla.
M.D.N.C.
N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ga.
N.D. Ill.
N.D. Miss.
N.D. Ohio
N.D.N.Y.
S.D.N.Y.

No. of
Opinions
7
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
24

W.D. Va.
W.D. Wash.
W.D. Wis.
Total

1
1
1
55
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Table 2. Statistical Characteristics of Case Files (N = 55)

No. of Artifacts
No. of Words
No. Raw
Citations
No. Case Uses

Mean
(std dev)
3.62
(1.02)
13,963.27
(13,259.41)
149.55
(111.09)
102.71
(79.51)

Median

1/7

Interquartile
Range
3–4

1,457 / 68,551

6,206 – 16,132

101

14 / 521

71 – 210

72

12 / 405

52 – 134

3
8,951

Min / Max

Table 3. Statistical Characteristics of Artifacts (N = 199)

No. of Words
No. Raw
Citations
No. Case Uses
Ratio: Case Uses
/ Raw Cites

Mean
(std dev)
3,859.20
(3,739.10)
41.33
(32.36)
28.39
(22.70)
0.72
(0.17)

Median

33

0 / 185

Interquartile
Range
1,724.5 –
4,991
18 – 52.5

23

0 / 150

13 – 38

0.14 / 1.00

0.63– 0.84

2,934

0.72

Min / Max
220 / 35,002
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Table 4. Normalized Raw Citations and Case Uses per Artifact (N = 199)

Raw Citations /
1000 words
Case Uses /
1000 words
Rule CUs /
1000 words
Generalization
CUs / 1000
words
Policy CUs /
1000 words
Example CUs /
1000 words
Quotation CUs /
1000 words

Mean (std
dev)
11.35
(3.90)
7.99
(3.13)
5.28
(2.69)
0.91
(1.10)
1.19
(1.10)
2.63
(1.71)
5.55
(2.57)

Median

Min / Max

11.33

0 / 20.33

Interquartile
Range
9.47 – 14.10

7.88

0 / 17.70

5.97 – 10.16

5.25

0 / 15.33

3.26 – 6.90

0.51

0 / 5.70

0.00 – 1.36

0.92

0 / 6.34

0.31 – 1.85

2.41

0 / 8.92

1.45 – 3.73

5.36

0 / 15.33

3.82 – 6.99
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Table 5. Briefs (n = 144) vs. Opinions (n = 55)
Mean
(std dev)

Total CUs / 1000
words
Briefs
Opinions
Rule / 1000 words **
Briefs
Opinions
Generalization / 1000
words *
Briefs
Opinions
Policy / 1000 words *
Briefs
Opinions
Example / 1000 words
**
Briefs
Opinions
Quotation / 1000
words
Briefs
Opinions

Media
n

Min / Max

Interquartil
e Range

7.85 (3.31)
8.33 (2.55)
4.92 (2.77)

4.85

0.00 /
15.33
0.94 /
11.09

2.99 – 6.37

6.22 (2.20)

6.23

0.81 (1.03)
1.16 (1.24)

0.38
0.76

0.00 / 4.68
0.00 / 5.70

0.00 – 1.23
0.06 – 1.73

1.06 (0.98)
1.51 (1.29)

0.85
1.21

0.00 / 4.69
0.00 / 6.34

0.20 – 1.75
0.60 – 2.28

2.93 (1.79)
1.86 (1.15)

2.85
1.76

0.00 / 8.92
0.00 / 5.15

1.70 – 3.91
0.98 – 2.46

5.35 (2.59)

5.18

3.57 – 6.89

6.09 (2.42)

6.01

0.00 /
15.33
0.74 /
11.49

4.68 – 7.77

4.27 – 7.56

Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between
briefs and opinions is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are designated with a single
asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically significant at A ≥ 0.62 with
two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for details regarding assessment
of statistical and practical significance.
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Table 6. Prevailing (n = 62) vs. Non-prevailing Briefs (n = 54)

Total CUs / 1000
words **
Prevailing
Non-prevailing
Rule / 1000 words *
Prevailing
Non-prevailing
Generalization / 1000
words
Prevailing
Non-prevailing
Policy / 1000 words **
Prevailing
Non-prevailing
Example / 1000 words
**
Prevailing
Non-prevailing
Quotation / 1000
words **
Prevailing
Non-prevailing

Mean
(std dev)

Media
n

8.71 (2.86)
7.12 (3.53)

8.67
6.93

2.22 / 17.35
0.00 /
17/70

6.80 – 10.49
4.81 – 8.25

5.44 (2.46)
4.68 (3.04)

5.52
4.43

1.08 / 14.61
0 / 15.33

3.84 – 6.43
2.83 – 6.24

0.89 (1.05)
0.85 (1.14)

0.51
0.36

0.00 / 4.68
0.00 / 4.42

0.00 – 1.41
0.00 – 1.29

1.31 (1.12)
0.85 (0.83)

0.97
0.60

0.00 / 4.69
0.00 / 2.88

0.35 – 2.03
0.00 – 1.45

3.26 (1.72)
2.58 (1.97)

3.05
2.33

0.00 / 8.92
0.00 / 8.11

2.17 – 4.48
1.14 – 3.81

6.05 (2.18)
4.71 (2.81)

5.88
4.30

1.91 / 12.94
0.00 /
15.33

4.79 – 7.30
2.85 – 6.28

Min / Max

Interquartile
Range

Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between
briefs of prevailing and non-prevailing parties is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are
designated with a single asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically
significant at A ≥ 0.62 with two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for
details regarding assessment of statistical and practical significance.
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Table 7. Briefs Making (n = 68) or Opposing (n = 62) Motions

Total CUs / 1000
words
Moving
Opposing
Rule / 1000 words **
Moving
Opposing
Generalization / 1000
words
Moving
Opposing
Policy / 1000 words
Moving
Opposing
Example / 1000 words
Moving
Opposing
Quotation / 1000
words **
Moving
Opposing

Mean
(std dev)

Media
n

Min / Max

Interquartile
Range

8.35 (3.24)
7.24 (3.20)

7.99
7.37

0 / 17.35
1.32 / 17.70

6.43 – 10.25
4.81 – 9.31

5.63 (2.89)
4.25 (2.33)

5.42
3.85

0 / 15.33
0 / 10.55

4.15 – 6.58
2.71 – 5.90

0.87 (0.97)
0.73 (1.02)

0.55
0.27

0 / 3.83
0 / 4.42

0.00 – 1.46
0.00 – 1.16

1.27 (1.11)
0.87 (0.81)

0.92
0.73

0 / 4.69
0 / 2.88

0.32 – 1.94
0.23 – 1.56

3.03 (1.80)
2.72 (1.86)

2.99
2.47

0 / 8.11
0 / 8.92

1.71 – 3.86
1.44 – 3.90

6.00 (2.72)
4.64 (2.22)

5.36
4.73

0 / 15.33
0.45 / 9.78

4.33 – 7.34
2.92 – 6.22

Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between
briefs of moving and non-moving parties is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are
designated with a single asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically
significant at A ≥ 0.62 with two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for
details regarding assessment of statistical and practical significance.
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Table 8. Artifacts from S.D.N.Y. (n = 96) or Other Courts (n = 103)

Total CUs / 1000
words
S.D.N.Y.
Other courts
Rule / 1000 words
S.D.N.Y.
Other courts
Generalization / 1000
words
S.D.N.Y.
Other courts
Policy / 1000 words **
S.D.N.Y.
Other courts
Example / 1000 words
*
S.D.N.Y.
Other courts
Quotation / 1000
words **
S.D.N.Y.
Other courts

Mean
(std dev)

Media
n

Min / Max

Interquartile
Range

8.35 (3.42)
7.64 (2.78)

7.97
7.74

0.68 / 17.70
0.00 / 17.35

6.03 – 10.54
5.97 – 9.29

5.25 (2.85)
5.30 (2.53)

5.42
5.10

0.00 / 15.33
0.00 / 14.61

3.17 – 6.87
3.34 – 6.90

1.02 (1.20)
0.80 (0.99)

0.70
0.36

0.00 / 5.70
0.00 / 3.71

0.00 – 1.43
0.00 – 1.34

1.38 (1.12)
1.00 (1.04)

1.22
0.76

0.00 / 6.34
0.00 / 5.86

0.49 – 1.98
0.11 – 1.55

2.92 (1.76)
2.37 (1.60)

2.60
2.12

0.00 / 8.92
0.00 / 8.11

1.75 – 4.03
1.31 – 3.09

6.22 (2.78)
4.93 (2.18)

6.05
4.98

0.00 / 15.33
0.00 /
10.74

4.33 – 7.95
3.60 – 6.19

Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between
from S.D.N.Y. and those from other courts is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are
designated with a single asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically
significant at A ≥ 0.62 with two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for
details regarding assessment of statistical and practical significance.

